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HEALTH CARE FRAUD MEANS NEVER HAVING TO
SAY YOU’RE SORRY
Jacob T. Elberg*
Abstract: For decades, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has issued a steady flood of press
releases announcing False Claims Act (FCA) settlements against health care entities and
extolling the purportedly sharp message sent to the industry through these settlements about
the consequences of engaging in wrongdoing. The FCA is the primary mechanism for
government enforcement against health care entities engaged in wrongdoing, and it is expected
to be DOJ’s key tool for addressing fraud arising out of government programs in response to
the COVID-19 pandemic. DOJ has pointed to three key goals of its enforcement efforts
(deterrence, incentivizing cooperation, and building a culture of compliance in the health care
industry). However, careful examination of the settlements touted in those DOJ press releases
calls into question whether DOJ’s settlement practices are conveying the message DOJ seeks
to impart or having the impact it hopes to achieve.
Virtually all FCA cases resolve without requiring the defendant to admit wrongdoing, and
many defendants issue explicit public denials of wrongdoing when the resolution is announced.
The absence of any need to admit wrongdoing has fueled a cost-of-doing-business narrative in
which health care entities are required periodically to pay inconsequential settlements to the
government regardless of their conduct. DOJ thereby risks both diminishing the general
deterrence value of resolutions and lending credence to the vocal skepticism among industry
and the defense bar that DOJ could, in fact, prevail at trial.
DOJ’s willingness to allow settlements in health care fraud cases without admissions is
diametrically contrary to DOJ’s policy in criminal cases, which is against permitting
resolutions without defendants’ clear and unequivocal acceptance of responsibility for
violating the law. Permitting no-responsibility settlements in the civil FCA context suggests
both that DOJ pursues, illegitimately, weak cases it cannot prove at trial, and potentially
weakens the general deterrence value of civil FCA claims in general. New defendants may be
left with cover that they are not wrongdoers but are merely ensnared in an illegitimate money
grab. Even defendants who frankly recognize that they are in violation of the statute may be
comforted that they likely face paying little more than restitution, and no significant penalties
or social opprobrium. These practices suggest that DOJ rewards willingness to settle, and the
monetary recovery it brings, above all other factors. DOJ’s focus on settling and monetary
recoveries in turn lends credence to the widespread belief that civil health care fraud
settlements simply do not signal wrongdoing.
There is no law, policy, or practice that prevents DOJ from requiring admissions in FCA
settlements. Yet an in-depth review of nearly 200 FCA resolutions involving health care
entities over the past two years reveals that approximately 92% did not include defendants’
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clear acceptance of responsibility, and approximately 37% involved defendants actively
denying responsibility.
The absence of any DOJ policy favoring admissions has important negative consequences,
undermining DOJ’s goals of deterrence, incentivizing cooperation, and building a culture of
compliance. First, when corporate actors believe DOJ will pursue claims regardless of
wrongdoing and the consequences of even a settlement will be relatively painless from a
financial and reputational perspective, those actors have reduced incentive to put in place
compliance structures dedicated to preventing wrongdoing. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, when corporate actors diminish the force of settlements with DOJ by denying
responsibility, they undermine the system’s legitimacy vital for DOJ to encourage cooperation
and for the government and well-meaning corporate actors to cultivate an industry-wide culture
of compliance. This Article examines DOJ policy both from an economic incentive perspective
and in light of research surrounding the psychology of legal authority, concluding that under
both lenses DOJ undercuts its own goals. With DOJ actively reforming FCA policy and the
FCA poised to take center stage in the government’s fight against COVID-19 program abuse,
it is beyond time to address this gap in DOJ’s enforcement policy.
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INTRODUCTION
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has for decades used the Civil False
Claims Act (FCA) as its primary mechanism for prosecuting wrongdoing
by health care companies. DOJ regularly points to the billions of dollars
recovered and the thousands of FCA settlements it has entered into as
significant not only in terms of recouping money for the government, but
as the centerpiece of DOJ’s efforts to prevent health care fraud through
deterrence. At the same time, DOJ has sought to supplement that
deterrence by creating a partnership with industry in support of
compliance and by encouraging companies to cooperate with government
investigations in order to secure individual prosecutions. Although the
FCA has been one of DOJ’s most apparently successful and visible
programs, little study has gone into whether DOJ’s practices fully support
the goals it seeks to achieve. This Article is the second in a series
examining DOJ’s health care FCA resolutions in light of DOJ’s
stated priorities.
In A Path to Data-Driven Health Care Enforcement, I unearthed and
analyzed data made available by recent changes to the tax code, allowing
insight into what, if anything, DOJ requires FCA offenders to pay beyond
restitution when settling claims.1 The study for the first time demonstrated
that DOJ prioritizes entering into some form of settlement, rather than
seeking more significant (if somewhat less likely and in any event less
immediate) recoveries that would increase general deterrence—most
resolutions amounted to little more than restitution in the form of
defendants putting the cookies back in the jar, when time value of money
is taken into account.2 Moreover, DOJ seemingly declines to provide a
benefit to defendants for engaging in what I have termed compliant
behaviors (maintenance of a pre-existing compliance program, postenforcement adoption of an effective compliance program, cooperation
with a government investigation, and self-disclosure of misconduct)

1. Jacob T. Elberg, A Path to Data-Driven Health Care Enforcement, 2020 UTAH L. REV. 1169.
2. Id. at 1194–96.
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despite DOJ policy that such behaviors should be rewarded.3 This Article
examines an even more troubling aspect of DOJ practice—not only failing
to require settling defendants to accept responsibility, but allowing them
to deny wrongdoing publicly, thereby undermining DOJ’s goals and the
legitimacy of the health care fraud enforcement system.
An in-depth review of nearly 200 FCA resolutions involving health
care entities over the past two years reveals that approximately 92% did
not include defendants’ clear acceptance of responsibility, and
approximately 37% involved defendants actively denying responsibility.
Notably, the few cases in which defendants did admit wrongdoing do
not differ by way of their subject matter, the facts, or available evidence.
Instead, they are distinguishable only on the basis of the U.S. Attorney’s
Offices pursuing the cases, which have unique internal, and informal,
policies favoring admission of wrongdoing.
Data analysis also reveals an additional troubling fact with respect to
these settlements. In 2019, DOJ announced a policy position that
acceptance of responsibility would be rewarded with more favorable
settlement terms.4 The data described in this Article provides no evidence
of any such benefit, and anecdotal evidence provides substantial reason
for skepticism that such a benefit exists at all. DOJ moving toward
favoring admission of wrongdoing, and actually rewarding acceptance of
responsibility in the terms of settlements that include such admissions
would benefit DOJ’s own enforcement goals.
The proper role of admissions in civil enforcement actions is not a new
topic. Most notably, the policy of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to have settling defendants “neither admit nor deny”
wrongdoing has been the subject of considerable controversy. An
influential federal judge took aim at the practice through multiple highprofile decisions.5 A powerful United States Senator held hearings and
issued a report slamming the SEC, Rigged Justice: 2016: How Weak
Enforcement Lets Corporate Offenders Off Easy.6 Scholars debated the

3. Id. at 1171–72; see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Issues Guidance on
False Claims Act Matters and Updates Justice Manual (May 7, 2019) [hereinafter DOJ May 7, 2019
Press Release], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-issues-guidance-false-claims-actmatters-and-updates-justice-manual [https://perma.cc/39CU-3Y6A].
4. DOJ May 7, 2019 Press Release, supra note 3.
5. SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v.
Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
6. OFF. OF SEN. ELIZABETH WARREN, RIGGED JUSTICE: 2016: HOW WEAK ENFORCEMENT LETS
CORPORATE OFFENDERS OFF EASY (2016), https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/
Rigged_Justice_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VRP-SJRN].
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policy’s impact and the appropriate remedy.7 The SEC announced a policy
change and its leadership gave numerous speeches explaining the
agency’s move towards seeking admissions.8 Scholars and other
observers measured and debated the impact of the SEC’s change.9
Strangely, none of that attention has been focused on the FCA—which
plays a parallel role in health care enforcement to that of the SEC in
securities enforcement. The lack of attention is even more stark
considering that DOJ continues to announce multi-billion dollar annual
FCA recoveries, health care fraud continues to make up a sizable portion
of the government’s expanding health care spend, and defendants
continue to do what even the SEC defendants did not—not only fail to
admit wrongdoing, but affirmatively deny it.10
DOJ’s reluctance to require admissions in FCA cases is surprising and

7. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public Enforcement of
Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 505, 510 (2013) (noting “[t]here is something troubling about a public
enforcement action that ends with a conclusion of ‘maybe he (they) did it, maybe he (they) didn’t, but
he’s (they are) paying a price for it in any event’”); Verity Winship & Jennifer K. Robbennolt,
Admissions of Guilt in Civil Enforcement, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1077, 1109–18 (2018) (referencing
press reports of “neither admit nor deny” resolutions).
8. See, e.g., Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Deploying the Full Enforcement
Arsenal, Speech at the Council of Institutional Investors Fall Conference (Sept. 26, 2013) [hereinafter
Speech at the Council of Institutional Investors], http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1370539841202#.Ukd93kKhDzI [https://perma.cc/7QJG-JWZG] (remarking that “there are some
cases where monetary penalties and compliance enhancements are not enough. An added measure of
public accountability is necessary, and in those cases we should demand it”); Mary Jo White, Chair,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, A New Model for SEC Enforcement: Producing Bold and Unrelenting
Results, Speech at the New York University Pollack Center for Law & Business (Nov. 18, 2016)
[hereinafter Speech at NYU], https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-speech-new-yorkuniversity-111816.html [https://perma.cc/FH88-K7BP] (stating “[t]he deterrent message of
settlements, and the public’s confidence in civil law enforcement, can be enhanced significantly by
requiring admissions of wrongdoing”).
9. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., ‘Neither Admit nor Deny’: Practical Implications of SEC’s New
Policy, LAW.COM: N.Y. L.J. (July 18, 2013), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/
1202611288235/ [https://perma.cc/DYE7-UE72] (describing the new policy as “shrewd, savvy and
largely symbolic”); Verity Winship & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, An Empirical Study of Admissions in
SEC Settlements, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 50 (2018) (analyzing settlements and concluding that the change
fell short of being “transformative”); David Rosenfeld, Admissions in SEC Enforcement Cases: The
Revolution that Wasn’t, 103 IOWA L. REV. 113, 175 (2017) (concluding that SEC rarely required
admissions even after the policy change and that it “calls into question the SEC’s claims concerning
the success of the admissions policy and whether the policy is worth maintaining”).
10. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers over $3 Billion from False
Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Jan. 9, 2020) [hereinafter DOJ Jan. 9, 2020 Press Release],
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-false-claims-act-casesfiscal-year-2019 [https://perma.cc/D6SJ-NPDZ].
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has estimated health care fraud at between 3% to 10% of health
care expenditures. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO THE PUBLIC
2007 (2008), https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/fcs_report2007 [https://perma.cc/K5F
A-WM8H].
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problematic not only because it undermines its enforcement goals, but
because it flies in the face of DOJ’s clear, and well-reasoned, criminalside (both as to health care matters and beyond) policy against allowing
resolutions without acceptance of responsibility.11 With DOJ examining
other aspects of its FCA practice and the FCA poised to take center stage
in DOJ’s efforts to prosecute fraud associated with COVID-19 funds, the
moment has arrived for DOJ to address its settlement policy.12
Part I provides the background of the FCA. Part II analyzes DOJ’s FCA
settlement policies and practices, particularly those focused on
admissions, revealing that DOJ rarely requires admissions and defendants
regularly make public statements denying wrongdoing. Part III compares
DOJ’s FCA settlement practice with that of DOJ in criminal cases, where
DOJ policy requires admissions in virtually all cases and is based on
concerns about undermining accountability for defendants and the
credibility of DOJ’s enforcement efforts. Part IV compares DOJ’s FCA
settlement practice with that of the SEC—a parallel area, as the SEC is a
primary means of enforcement in securities matters while the FCA is
DOJ’s primary means of enforcement against health care entities. The
SEC’s policy is stricter than DOJ’s FCA practice regarding admissions,
yet the SEC has faced substantial criticism of its policy as insufficient,
while DOJ has to-date largely escaped scrutiny in this area. Part V places
DOJ’s FCA policy in the context of its enforcement goals by examining
how DOJ’s failure to require admissions—and worse yet its willingness
to allow denials—harms DOJ’s efforts to incentivize cooperation and
create a culture of compliance in the health care industry. Part VI
considers potential rationales for DOJ’s current policy surrounding
admissions.
Part VII examines the costs and benefits of a new DOJ policy requiring
admissions in FCA cases. The Article concludes the potential costs are
likely not as significant as DOJ might fear, and the benefits are likely
greater than DOJ currently comprehends. Taking into consideration both
11. It must be noted that all admissions are not equal. In criminal pleas, defendants typically make
admissions not only as to facts but as to their legal consequence—establishing guilt. Civil resolutions,
however, may alternatively involve solely admissions of fact, which may take a variety of forms. See
Winship & Robbennolt, supra note 7, at 1095–1109 (identifying various admissions models). While
there are arguments weighing in favor and against requiring each in the context of FCA settlements,
it is beyond the scope of this article to engage in that nuanced discussion at this time, as DOJ has thus
far largely been unwilling to require admissions of any sort, or even to prevent explicit denials.
12. See, e.g., Ethan P. Davis, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civ. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Speech at the United States Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform (June 26, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/civil/speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-ethan-p-davisdelivers-remarks-false-claims [https://perma.cc/QAG4-Z29B] (describing the False Claims Act as
“one of the most effective weapons in [DOJ’s] arsenal” in the effort to “prevent wrongdoers from
exploiting the COVID-19 crisis”).
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practical, short-term concerns as well as DOJ’s broader enforcement
goals, the Article concludes that DOJ should, at minimum, require
acceptance of responsibility in the most significant FCA cases, while
insisting upon “no denial” language in any cases which do not
include admissions.
I.

THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT

This Part provides an overview of the FCA and its critical role in health
care enforcement.
A.

The FCA Is the Government’s Primary Health Care Fraud
Enforcement Tool

While for some industries criminal prosecutions are DOJ’s primary
enforcement mechanism, in the health care industry, DOJ’s efforts have
long been focused on civil cases brought under the False Claims Act.13 In
Fiscal Year 2019 alone, DOJ recovered $2.6 billion from settlements and
judgments in FCA cases involving the health care industry, representing
the tenth consecutive year that DOJ’s civil health care fraud settlements
and judgments have exceeded $2 billion.14 Between 2010 and 2019, DOJ
recovered $25.4 billion from settlements and judgments in FCA cases
involving the health care industry.15 With eye-catching numbers year after
year, FCA recoveries have been DOJ’s primary method of targeting
organizations for health care fraud.16
DOJ has noted that, particularly in the health care arena, FCA cases are
a primary mechanism not only for punishing misconduct and recovering
money, but also for deterring fraud. In the December 2018 press release
announcing the Fiscal Year 2018 recoveries, DOJ noted “the
Department’s vigorous pursuit of health care fraud prevents billions . . . in
13. See, e.g., Lewis Morris & Gary W. Thompson, Reflections on the Government’s Stick and
Carrot Approach to Fighting Health Care Fraud, 51 ALA. L. REV. 319, 327–28 (1999) (referring to
the FCA as “the Government’s Primary Weapon Against Fraud” and pointing to the FCA’s qui tam
provision as a primary reason for its growth); Pamela H. Bucy, Growing Pains: Using the False
Claims Act to Combat Health Care Fraud, 51 ALA. L. REV. 57, 59–60 (1999) (concluding that the
FCA’s qui tam provision, lower mens rea requirement, and lower burden of proof, combined with the
fact that most health care providers have substantial assets, makes the FCA a “potent and appropriate
weapon to use against fraudulent health care providers”); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies,
The Empire Strikes Back: A Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA.
L. REV. 239, 247–49 (1999) (noting DOJ’s increasing reliance on the FCA to prosecute health
care offenses).
14. DOJ Jan. 9, 2020 Press Release, supra note 10.
15. CIV. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FRAUD STATISTICS: HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1354316/download [https://perma.cc/RR6P-WZCV].
16. See Morris & Thompson, supra note 13, at 327.
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losses by deterring those who might otherwise try to cheat the system for
their own gain.”17
Experts and observers are already anticipating the FCA will be the
primary tool used by the government to address fraud relating to the multitrillion-dollar economic stimulus packages in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic.18
B.

Background and Structure of the FCA

The FCA was originally enacted by Congress during the Civil War in
response to concerns regarding fraud against the government by
contractors selling “sick mules, lame horses, sawdust instead of
gunpowder, and rotted ships with fresh paint.”19 While the FCA remains
a generally important tool for enforcement in government contracting,
over the last thirty years it has been primarily used to address health care
fraud.20 In Fiscal Year 2019, for example, the $2.6 billion recovered by
DOJ from FCA cases involving the health care industry was roughly 87%
of the $3 billion recovered in total by DOJ from FCA cases.21
The FCA imposes penalties on anyone who “knowingly presents . . . a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” to the federal
government.22 A violation of the FCA “includes four elements: falsity,
causation, knowledge, and materiality.”23 In the context of the FCA,
“knowledge” means that a person “has actual knowledge,” “acts in

17. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers over $2.8 Billion from False
Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018 (Dec. 21, 2018) [hereinafter DOJ Dec. 21, 2018 Press Release],
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-28-billion-false-claims-act-casesfiscal-year-2018 [https://perma.cc/F9LB-U4GD].
18. See, e.g., Memorandum from John D.W. Partridge, Jonathan M. Philips, James L. Zelenay, Jr.
& Sean S. Twomey, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP to Clients & Friends
(Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.gibsondunn.com/ implications-of-covid-19-crisis-for-false-claims-actcompliance/ [https://perma.cc/X3Z3-BPL4] (noting that “FCA enforcement has been particularly
robust when emergency government spending ramps up, giving opportunists the chance to exploit the
public fisc, even when lives are at stake”); Memorandum from Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison LLP to Clients (May 19, 2020), https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/litigation/ whitecollar-regulatory-defense/publications/false-claims-act-liability-in-the-age-of-covid-19?id=36918
[https://perma.cc/JCV4-ATR8] (stating a “heightened level of scrutiny [on government spending] has
brought new focus on the False Claims Act”).
19. DOJ Dec. 21, 2018 Press Release, supra note 17.
20. See DOJ Jan. 9, 2020 Press Release, supra note 10.
21. Id.
22. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A).
23. See United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 487 (3d Cir. 2017) (first
citing Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1989,
1996 (2016); and then citing United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295,
304–05 (3d Cir. 2011)).
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deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information,” or “acts in
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information,” but does not
require proof of intent to defraud.24
The FCA provides that a person who violates the FCA “is liable to the
United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than [$11,181]
and not more than [$22,363], . . . plus 3 times the amount of damages
which the Government sustains because of the act [of the person violating
the FCA].”25 Damages (referred to as single damages) are generally the
amount of money the United States paid to the offending company as a
result of the false claim.26 Thus, recovering single damages can be seen as
making the government whole.27
II.

DOJ’S POLICIES AND PRACTICES SURROUNDING FCA
SETTLEMENTS AND ADMISSIONS

Aided by an empirical analysis of DOJ’s recent FCA resolutions with
health care entities, this Part details DOJ’s policies and practices
concerning damages multipliers, admissions, and statements of facts. This
Part then compares DOJ’s FCA settlements to DOJ’s own statements and
guidance surrounding the resolution of FCA matters, concluding that
while DOJ guidance purports to reward acceptance of responsibility, the
settlements reveal no evidence of any such reward. At the same time, a
significant number of defendants deny wrongdoing while entering into
FCA settlements, and appear to face no consequences for doing so.
A.

Analysis of DOJ’s FCA Settlements Between Early 2018 and
April 2020

Within the above framework, DOJ has long trumpeted its ability to
obtain treble damages plus penalties—three times the amount of damages
sustained by the Government.28 One 2018 DOJ press release announcing
a FCA settlement went so far as to note that treble damages are the
“typical[]” liability under the FCA.29 But DOJ is not required to demand

24. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)–(B).
25. Id. § 3729(a)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 85.5 (2020).
26. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550–52 (1943).
27. Id. As discussed in section II.A and recently recognized by DOJ, because of lost interest and
other factors, a recovery actually must be beyond single damages to truly make the government whole.
28. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).
29. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Medical Equipment Company Agrees to Pay $5.25 Million
to Resolve Allegations of Fraudulent Claims for Compounded Medical Creams (Oct. 22, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edky/pr/medical-equipment-company-agrees-pay-525-millionresolve-allegations-fraudulent-claims [https://perma.cc/RDE2-TVP8].

Elberg (Do Not Delete)

380

6/5/2021 10:46 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:371

treble damages (or penalties) in resolving a FCA case. While industry and
the defense bar have long believed that DOJ rarely seeks treble damages,
notably, there is no guidance or publicly available information provided
by DOJ as to what constitutes a standard settlement or what factors
influence what DOJ will demand.30
Despite DOJ’s statements regarding the potential for treble damages
plus penalties under the False Claims Act, analysis demonstrates DOJ
does not regularly obtain treble damages in practice. A review of all civilonly FCA settlements entered into between health care business
organizations and DOJ between early 2018 and May 31, 2019, found
eighty-nine Civil Settlement Agreements (CSAs) for which the multiplier
could be determined. The settlements were on average 1.78 times the
single damages and the median multiplier was 2.0.31 Of those CSAs, only
eleven (12%) were above double damages, let alone treble damages—
forty-four were at double damages and thirty-four were between 1.0–
1.9.32 The analysis “confirm[s] widespread sentiment amongst industry
and the defense bar that settlement multipliers are rarely above double
damages.”33 Virtually all of those settlements involved conduct from
several years prior, and therefore a multiplier substantially above 1.0
would have been required simply to cover restitution plus interest, given
the time value of money. A significant number of FCA resolutions—
touted by the government as sending a deterrent message to industry—
effectively required defendants only to repay what amount to no-interest
loans to the government, having kept some or all of the ill-gotten gains
for a decade or more.34
30. See, e.g., BRIAN C. ELMER & ALAN W.H. GOURLEY, CROWELL & MORING LLP, FCA
SETTLEMENTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR DEFENSE COUNSEL (2003), https://www.crowell.com/
documents/docassocfktype_presentations_440.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZ87-KEED] (“In settling,
DOJ does not insist on treble damages, although it will not acknowledge any specific policy to settle
for less than treble damages. It does insist that, at a minimum, the government must be compensated
for its entire loss, and it usually strives for at least double damages.”).
31. Elberg, supra note 1, at 1194. A multiplier of 2.0 constitutes double damages, a multiplier of
3.0 constitutes treble damages, etc.
32. Id.
33. Id. It should be noted that some settlements contained language indicating that DOJ had
considered the defendant’s ability to pay in agreeing to the settlement. However, even removing those
settlements from the analysis would not meaningfully change the statistical analysis. What is more,
even where defendants do not have the ability to pay a full settlement in a lump sum at the time of
settlement, DOJ can require defendants to pay a full settlement over time or include contingency
arrangements rather than reduce the settlement amount. See Memorandum from Ethan P. Davis,
Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Civ. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to All Civ. Div. Emps. (Sept. 4, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/civil/page/file/1313361/download [https://perma.cc/AR2D-TT43].
34. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Pentec Health, Inc. to Pay $17 Million to Settle
False Claims Act Allegations (Feb. 4, 2019) [hereinafter DOJ Feb. 4, 2019 Press Release],
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U.S. Attorney’s Offices have authority to settle claims without
oversight when the gross amount of the original claim does not exceed
$10,000,000.35 Settlements above those amounts must be approved by
DOJ’s Civil Division—specifically the Commercial Litigation Branch in
the case of health care FCA cases—unless the Civil Division delegates
responsibility for the case to the individual U.S. Attorney’s Office.36
While DOJ has recovered more than $2 billion each year over the past
decade from FCA cases involving the health care industry, the vast
majority of FCA settlements have involved relatively small dollar
amounts.37 Of the 195 health care industry FCA resolutions between early
2018 and April 2020 reviewed for this Article, only four were at or
exceeded $100 million, nine were at or exceeded $50 million, and thirtyone were at or exceeded $20 million. At the same time, 115 were at or
below $5 million, of which fifty were at or below $1 million. As Figure 1
shows, most FCA settlements during this time period did not involve eyepopping dollar figures.
Figure 1:
Dollar Value of Civil-Only FCA Agreements

https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/pentec-health-inc-pay-17-million-settle-false-claims-actallegations [https://perma.cc/WDK7-493Q] (describing the time period of the misconduct as “2007
to 2018”).
35. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual: Civ. Res. Manual § 46 (2016).
36. Id.
37. See DOJ Jan. 9, 2020 Press Release, supra note 10.
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DOJ Rarely Obtains Admissions in Its FCA Resolutions, and Many
Settling Defendants Deny Wrongdoing

Unlike in other government enforcement contexts discussed below,
FCA settlements have historically not required defendants to accept
responsibility or admit wrongdoing. As strongly worded and triumphant
as DOJ’s FCA press releases might be—frequently boasting of “hold[ing
defendants] accountable”—most DOJ FCA press releases describe the
settlements as “resolv[ing] allegations,” and include the disclaimer: “The
claims resolved by the settlement are allegations only, and there has been
no determination of liability.”38 That is because the vast majority of FCA
settlement agreements contain the following language:
This Settlement Agreement is neither an admission of liability by
[defendant] nor a concession by the United States that its claims
are not well-founded.39
To avoid the delay, uncertainty, inconvenience, and expense of
protracted litigation of the above claims, and in consideration of
the mutual promises and obligations of this Settlement
Agreement, the Parties agree and covenant as follows . . . .40
With this language in place, defendants are empowered to publicly
deny—often aggressively—DOJ’s allegations.41 And they do. I conducted
38. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Nursing Home Chain Saber Healthcare Agrees to Pay
$10 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
nursing-home-chain-saber-healthcare-agrees-pay-10-million-settle-false-claims-act-allegations
[https://perma.cc/V2DM-JWK8]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Reference Laboratory, Pain
Clinic, and Two Individuals Agree to Pay $41 Million to Resolve Allegations of Unnecessary Urine
Drug Testing (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/reference-laboratory-pain-clinic-andtwo-individuals-agree-pay-41-million-resolve-allegations [https://perma.cc/5L73-UQ83].
39. See Settlement Agreement at 4, United States ex rel. Landis v. Genova Diagnostics, Inc.,
No. 1:17-CV-00341-MR-WCM (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2020) [hereinafter Genova Settlement].
This language or its functional equivalent appeared in 151 of the 195 CSAs reviewed for purposes
of this Article.
Some CSA’s included additional language in which the defendant expressly denied some or all of
the government’s allegations in the CSA itself. Of the 195 CSAs reviewed for purposes of this Article,
fifty—more than 25%—included explicit denials within the CSA.
Regardless of whether such language is included in the CSA, the standard language—included in
virtually all agreements—allows the defendant to publicly deny the allegations.
40. See Genova Settlement, supra note 39, at 4. This language or its functional equivalent appeared
in 167 of the 195 CSAs since early 2018 reviewed for purposes of this Article.
41. One particularly active district, the District of Massachusetts, did not include either paragraph
in fourteen of the fifteen CSAs included in this Article’s review. This silence, however, did not
prevent two defendants from making public statements of denial outside of the CSA. See Nate
Raymond, Drugmakers Astellas, Amgen to Pay $125 Million in U.S. Charity Kickback Probe,
REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2019, 7:07 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthcare-charitiessettlement/drugmakers-astellas-amgen-to-pay-125-million-in-u-s-charity-kickback-probe-
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a review of CSAs between early 2018 and April 2020, as well as
statements made by the defendants in press releases or in news media
coverage related to the settlements.42 Of the 195 CSAs reviewed for
purposes of this Article, in seventy-two cases (37%) the defendant
affirmatively denied having committed misconduct.43 Fifty of the CSAs
(26%) included explicit denials by the defendants in the agreement, while
in others the defendants denied wrongdoing either through corporate press
releases or in response to media inquiries.44
For example, when DOJ settled an FCA case against a hospital system
for $24 million in October 2018, the defendant provided a statement to
the media the day of the announcement denying it did anything wrong,
stating that the hospital system
continues to strongly disagree with the allegations, [but] we are
relieved to put this issue behind us. The Board of Trustees
carefully considered the ongoing costs and distraction that
litigation would impose upon the system, our employees, and the
communities we serve . . . . We believe that a settlement allows
our system to put this difficult matter behind us . . . .45
In another example, in February 2019, DOJ announced a $17 million
settlement with a compounding pharmacy alleging violations of the AntiKickback Statute and submission of duplicate bills.46 The DOJ press
release included a statement from a U.S. Attorney stating that “[t]hose
who engage in these practices will be held accountable.”47 The same day,
the defendant issued a press release denying the settlement reflected
wrongdoing:
[R]esolution of this civil matter represents a business decision
made in the best interest of our company and nothing more. We
firmly believe that, at all times, [the company] billed all
government payors appropriately while providing countless
patients with access to these life-saving nutritional

idUSKCN1S11TL [https://perma.cc/VB3U-B3W5] (“Neither company admitted wrongdoing.
Amgen in a statement said it did not agree that its conduct was inappropriate but settled to put the
matter behind it. Astellas also said it believed its actions were lawful.”).
42. A table summarizing the data is included at app. 1 and app. 2.
43. Infra app. 1.
44. Infra app. 2.
45. John Commins, Montana Health System Pays $24M to Settle Kickback Allegations,
HEALTHLEADERS (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/montana-health-systempays-24m-settle-kickback-allegations (last visited Apr. 2, 2021).
46. See DOJ Feb. 4, 2019 Press Release, supra note 34.
47. Id.
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therapies . . . .48
The press release included a quote from the chief executive officer
stating “we continue to deny the assertions and allegations made by the
government pertaining to this settlement which in any way challenges our
business practices.”49
In another example, in April 2020, DOJ announced a $43 million
settlement involving allegations that a lab had fraudulently billed for
unnecessary lab services, with the Assistant Attorney General boasting
that providers billing for unnecessary services “will be held
accountable.”50 A company spokesman explicitly denied the allegations
when contacted by reporters, stating
We conducted our own thorough investigation and are confident
in the medical necessity of our tests and that [we] acted
completely appropriately . . . . While we believed that [we] would
have prevailed, we are pleased to avoid considerable distraction
and expense by resolving this matter without any admission of
guilt or wrongdoing.51
Defendants make these statements knowing not only that they are
permissible under their settlements agreements, but also that DOJ policy
prevents DOJ from providing additional information beyond the CSA and
documents already in the public record to respond to defense denials.52
The policy holds despite the fact that defendants’ denials amount to
suggestions that DOJ attorneys demanded settlements to end
meritless lawsuits.53

48. Press Release, Pentec Health, Pentec Health Announced the Closure and Settlement of a Civil
Matter with the United States Attorney’s Office (Feb. 4, 2019), https://markets.businessinsider.com/
news/stocks/pentec-health-announced-the-closure-and-settlement-of-a-civil-matter-with-the-unitedstates-attorney-s-office-1027922824# [https://perma.cc/39F7-MEPP].
49. Id.
50. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Testing Laboratory Agrees to Pay Up to $43 Million to
Resolve Allegations of Medically Unnecessary Tests (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/testing-laboratory-agrees-pay-43-million-resolve-allegations-medically-unnecessary-tests
[https://perma.cc/QG8P-JYS7].
51. Daniel Walton, Genova Diagnostics Settles Billing Fraud Claims for Up to $43M, MOUNTAIN
XPRESS (May 9, 2020), https://mountainx.com/news/genova-diagnostics-settles-billing-fraud-claimsfor-up-to-43m/ [https://perma.cc/ZK5B-GLYJ]; Christopher Brown, ‘Unconventional’ Tests Bring
$17 Million False Claims Settlement (1), BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 28, 2020, 8:40 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/unconventional-tests-bring-17-millionfalse-claims-settlement (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
52. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 1-7.100 (2018).
53. Id.
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DOJ’s Use of Covered Conduct Language for Purposes of Both
Allegations and Releases Exacerbates Problems Caused by Lack of
Admissions

The lack of admissions is particularly problematic in FCA cases
because the mechanics of DOJ’s settlement model prevents the public, in
most cases, from differentiating allegations which the government could
clearly prove from those which were largely speculative.
FCA settlement agreements include a “Covered Conduct” section
listing DOJ’s allegations. Because the Covered Conduct determines the
scope of the release, some defendants seek broad Covered Conduct
descriptions as protection against future litigation. As one primer for FCA
defense counsel described, “[t]he goal for every FCA defendant . . . is to
negotiate the broadest possible release by writing the broadest definition
of covered conduct.”54 As a result, at the drafting stage it is frequently the
defendant seeking to add allegations to the Covered Conduct and many
CSAs include several allegations. Yet, CSAs generally do not distinguish
between allegations that are the centerpiece of DOJ’s case—which
presumably DOJ would expect to be able to prove at trial—and those the
government would not have included in a filed complaint and which were
added through negotiation at defendant’s request. In effect, the public
cannot read a CSA and know what the case was truly about.
For instance, if the Covered Conduct includes three allegations (for
example, allegations of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute, of off-label
marketing, and of causing billing for unnecessary goods or services) and
the defendant agrees to pay $5 million to resolve all of the allegations,
there is no way for the public to know whether virtually all of that money
was paid because of one of the allegations or whether it was evenly split
amongst the several.55 Put simply, a reader cannot know from a typical
CSA what misconduct DOJ truly alleges occurred, never mind whether
DOJ’s allegations have merit, and there is no other mechanism through
which an observer can obtain that information.
What is more, typical Covered Conduct language is terse and vague—
most CSAs do not include detailed descriptions of the alleged
wrongdoing, never mind describe any of the evidence DOJ had collected
54. Jonathan Cone, Robert Rhoad & Robert Sneckenberg, Negotiating False Claims Act
Settlements, BRIEFING PAPERS, Feb. 2014, at 1, 2, https://www.crowell.com/files/Negotiating-FalseClaims-Act-Settlements.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KUY-28D2].
55. See, e.g., Genova Settlement, supra note 39, at 2–4 (listing four different allegations, ranging
from violations of the Stark Law to billing for unnecessary services, without delineating the portion
of the $43 million settlement was attributable to the various allegations). The defendant explicitly
denied the allegations, telling a media outlet it believed it would have won at trial had the case not
resolved via settlement. See Brown, supra note 51.
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to prove its case.56 As detailed below, this too is a significant departure
from DOJ’s practice in criminal cases.57
Even were the public able to discern DOJ’s true allegations, that would
not provide a complete picture because there may, or may not, be
legitimate disagreement between the government and the defendant
regarding the strength of DOJ’s case. And while the settlement model
encourages defendants to seek expanded Covered Conduct language, they
can do so knowing they will be able to immediately distance themselves
from the allegations, as described above. In fact, the FCA defense counsel
primer referenced above even asserts: “It may seem counterintuitive, but
once a company has fine-tuned the conduct for which it is buying a
release, it needs to go back and point out that it never actually engaged in
that conduct!”58
D.

DOJ’s FCA Resolutions Appear to Contradict Recent Changes to
DOJ’s FCA Policy

While DOJ has not put in place a policy requiring acceptance of
responsibility (or even prohibiting denials) in FCA cases, a recent change
to DOJ policy regarding FCA resolutions did suggest DOJ sees a benefit
in securing admissions. In May 2019, DOJ issued for the first time, formal
guidance (FCA Guidance) regarding rewards for compliant behaviors—
maintenance of an effective pre-existing compliance program, postenforcement adoption of an effective compliance program, cooperation
with a government investigation, and self-disclosure of misconduct—in

56. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement at 1–2, United States ex rel. Whitaker v. LifeCare Med.
Transps., Inc., No. 1:17-CV-1327 (E.D. Va. Apr. 8, 2020) [hereinafter LifeCare Settlement]
(describing Covered Conduct as “submission of claims to Medicare for non-emergency basic life
support ambulance services and non-emergency advanced life support ambulance services . . . that
were not medically reasonable or necessary and/or were not supported by the medical record,” and
without providing any additional details regarding the alleged wrongdoing or evidence supporting the
government’s allegations).
57. While virtually all criminal resolutions include a charging document (Indictment, Information,
or Complaint), as described below, most civil FCA resolutions are reached without DOJ ever filing a
Complaint with detailed allegations. This is in part because approximately two-thirds of FCA
resolutions examined stemmed from qui tams, and qui tams accounted for more than two-thirds of
money ($2.1 billion out of $3 billion) recovered by DOJ through FCA cases in Fiscal Year 2019. See
DOJ Jan. 9, 2020 Press Release, supra note 10. When a qui tam is filed, the initial Complaint (and
often the only Complaint) is drafted by the relator (whistleblower). The initial qui tam Complaint is
often of little value in analyzing the basis for the ultimate resolution with DOJ, both because it does
not reflect DOJ’s investigation, and because the relator is incentivized by first-to-file rules to include
all potential claims in the initial Complaint, even if some are merely speculative. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(b)(5) (“[N]o person other than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based
on the facts underlying the pending action.”).
58. Cone, Rhoad & Sneckenberg, supra note 54, at 6.

Elberg (Do Not Delete)

2021]

6/5/2021 10:46 AM

HEALTH CARE FRAUD

387

FCA cases.59 The FCA Guidance “identif[ies] factors that will be
considered and the credit that will be provided” based on
compliant behaviors.60
While the FCA Guidance largely mirrors the Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations, which govern DOJ’s handling of
criminal cases, there is a notable exception: the FCA Guidance includes
“[a]dmitting liability or accepting responsibility for the wrongdoing or
relevant conduct” among the “Forms of Cooperation” for which an entity
can earn credit.61 Under the Guidance, DOJ states that acceptance of
responsibility can lead to a reduction in the demanded multiplier.62 This
is contrary to the criminal context where acceptance of responsibility is a
pre-requisite for cooperation credit rather than an example of cooperation,
both under DOJ criminal policy and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
(where acceptance of responsibility without cooperation is separately
rewarded), and where, as discussed below, DOJ requires it to resolve
a case.63
Despite DOJ’s new FCA Guidance claiming to reward acceptance of
responsibility, examination of FCA resolutions over the past two years
provides no support for DOJ’s claim that acceptance of responsibility is
rewarded through a reduced multiplier. In fact, the settlements appear to
demonstrate the opposite.
Notably, there is nothing that prevents DOJ from seeking admissions
as a condition of FCA settlements—not statutorily, procedurally, or even
as a matter of official DOJ policy. The almost universal failure to require
an admission is instead an unofficial policy demonstrated by DOJ’s
practice, as revealed by the analysis conducted for this Article. Of the 195
CSAs from the past two years reviewed for this Article, only sixteen (8%)
included admissions which amounted to acceptance of responsibility—
twelve handled by one of two U.S. Attorney’s Offices and only two with
the involvement of the Commercial Litigation Branch.64
59. DOJ May 7, 2019 Press Release, supra note 3; see also Elberg, supra note 1, at 1189–91; U.S.
Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 4-4.112 (2019).
60. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 4-4.112 (2019).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g)(2)–(3) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
64. E.g., Stipulation & Order of Settlement & Dismissal at 3–4, United States v. CareFusion Corp.
(S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2019) [hereinafter CareFusion Settlement]; Stipulation & Order of Settlement at
3–7, United States ex rel. Markelson v. Lenox Hill Hosp., No. 17 Civ. 7986 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
7, 2019) [hereinafter Lenox Hill Settlement]; Stipulation & Order of Settlement & Dismissal at 3–6,
United States ex rel. Bixler Wood v. Avalign Technologies, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 4958 (ER) (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 9, 2019) [hereinafter Avalign Settlement]; Settlement Agreement at 3, United States ex rel.
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The Commercial Litigation Branch’s clear practice, and thus what is in
effect its unofficial policy, is not to seek admissions in health care cases.
While the Commercial Litigation Branch participated in 69 of the 195
settlements reviewed for purposes of this Article, only two (less than 3%)
included admissions. DOJ is far more likely to allow an explicit denial
within a CSA than insist upon an admission, particularly in cases
involving the Commercial Litigation Branch.
However, approximately two-thirds of FCA cases are handled by
individual U.S. Attorney’s offices without the involvement of the
Commercial Litigation Branch, and in the absence of limiting DOJ policy,
those U.S. Attorney’s Offices are free to adopt their own individual
practices.65 Two U.S. Attorney’s Offices (the Southern District of New
York and the Northern District of New York) have a practice of seeking
admissions in virtually all cases, while two other districts (the Eastern
District of Kentucky and the Eastern District of Texas) included
admissions in two and one CSA, respectively.66

Cretaro-Williams v. Dr. Fazeli & Dr. Broumand, PLLC, No. 5:15-CV-315 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018);
Civil Settlement Agreement, United States ex rel. Katko v. Oviatt Hearing & Balance, LLC, No. 5:16CV-1217 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2018).
All of these admissions took the form of factual admissions rather than legal admissions. See
Winship & Robbennolt, supra note 7, at 1104–07.
One of the two districts responsible for all but four of the CSAs with admissions was the Southern
District of New York—the District in which Judge Rakoff issued the opinions discussed infra Part IV.
The other was the Northern District of New York. Based on a review of CSAs from the Northern
District of New York, the District appears to have instituted its policy of requiring admissions after a
2014 settlement without admissions led a prominent FCA attorney—and former head of DOJ’s
Criminal Fraud Section’s Healthcare Fraud Unit—representing the defendant to aggressively deny
wrongdoing, telling a reporter that the defendant settled only to avoid the cost and expense of
litigation, and adding: “In a situation where there was absolutely no harm or inappropriate conduct of
any kind, the government can extract money from cardiologists who make far less than the average
doctor and treat all Medicaid patients who walk in the door.” James T. Mulder, Syracuse-Area
Medical Practice Pays $1.3 Million to Settle Allegations It Improperly Paid
Doctors, SYRACUSE.COM (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.syracuse.com/news/2014/08/medical_
practice_pays_13_million_to_settle_allegations_it_improperly_paid_doctor.html
[https://perma.cc/622N-FR49].
65. Of the 195 CSAs reviewed for purposes of this Article, 125, or 64%, were handled by individual
U.S. Attorney’s Offices without the involvement of the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation
Branch, with more than two dozen U.S. Attorney’s Offices resolving cases on their own. See also
Elberg, supra note 1, at 1197 (noting that 74 out of 118 CSAs reviewed, or 63%, “were handled by
individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices without the involvement of the [Civil Division’s] Commercial
Litigation Branch”).
66. These resolutions not only call into question DOJ’s commitment to the acceptance of
responsibility benefit claimed in the May 2019 FCA Guidance, but also represent another striking
example of lack of consistency across DOJ components—defendants will seemingly be pressed to
make admissions if the case is handled by two of ninety-four federal districts, and may be if the case
is handled by a few others, and will likely not if it is handled by any of the other districts. See id. at
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Seemingly contrary to the May 2019 FCA Guidance, those sixteen
settlements required the defendants to pay 9.73, 2.28, 2.05, 2.04, 2.0, 2.0,
2.0, 2.0, 2.0, 2.0, 2.0, 2.0, 1.74, 1.5, and 1.0 times restitution. The
admissions settlements as a group had an average multiplier of 1.90 and
all but two were above the mean multiplier of 1.73 for the 195 CSAs
reviewed for purposes of this Article.67 It is of course possible that there
are unknown facts making these cases particularly egregious and that
these defendants would have been required to pay even higher multipliers
had they not accepted responsibility. But there is significant reason for
skepticism, as DOJ resolves the vast majority of FCA cases at or below
double damages.68
At the same time, there are numerous examples of defendants not only
declining to make admissions, but explicitly denying wrongdoing at the
time of settlement, yet receiving notably low multipliers. For example, a
lab that issued a clear denial on the day of the settlement, attributing the
$42.6 million settlement to “run[ning] out of energy to continue prolonged
legal proceedings,” was permitted to settle the case for single damages.69
The lab thus did nothing more than pay restitution, and without any
interest despite the fact that the government alleged the wrongdoing took
place as many as six years earlier.70
The three defendants whose denials of wrongdoing were detailed in
section I.D, similarly received low multipliers despite their denials. The
health system was required to pay only single damages—again paying
nothing more than restitution, without interest, despite the alleged
1198 (noting lack of uniformity in settlement multipliers across U.S. Attorney’s Offices).
The Eastern District of Texas entered into two other CSAs during the relevant time period, both of
which not only did not include admissions, but included express denials by the defendants. The
Eastern District of Kentucky entered into a total of seven CSAs during the relevant time period—two
of the other five included express denials by the defendants, while the other three contained neither
admissions nor denials.
67. See, e.g., CareFusion Settlement, supra note 64, at 5 (2.0 multiplier); Lenox Hill Settlement,
supra note 64, at 7–8 (1.74 multiplier); Avalign Settlement, supra note 64, at 7 (2.0 multiplier). The
analysis of the admissions cases includes multipliers from thirteen of the sixteen cases. The multiplier
was not calculable for two cases and one (9.73) was excluded as an outlier. The analysis of the overall
mean includes multipliers from 161 of the 195 cases. The multiplier was not calculable for thirtythree cases and one (9.73) was excluded as an outlier.
68. Elberg, supra note 1, at 1194. Providing further reason for skepticism, the Southern District of
New York resolved eight cases during the relevant time period without requiring admissions, and did
not require a multiplier above 2.0 in any of the eight.
69. Jonathan Stempel, Gene Testing Firm Gets 25-Year Ban in $42.6 Million Kickback Settlement,
REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2019, 3:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-utc-labs/gene-testing-firmgets-25-year-ban-in-42-6-million-kickback-settlement-idUSKBN1WO2TB [https://perma.cc/28DHJPXS].
70. See id.; Civil Settlement Agreement at 3–5, United States ex rel. Bergeron v. UTC Laboratories,
Inc., No. 14-CV-2464 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2019) [hereinafter UTC Settlement].
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wrongdoing taking place as many as eight years prior.71 The compounding
pharmacy was also required to pay only single damages without interest
despite the alleged wrongdoing going back as far as eleven years,72 and
the testing lab was required to pay only a multiplier of 1.41 despite the
alleged wrongdoing taking place as many as ten years prior.73
In another example, when a compounding pharmacy and its private
equity fund owner agreed to pay $21.4 million to settle allegations of a
kickback scheme in September 2019, the U.S. Attorney for the
responsible district hailed the resolution as “demonstrat[ing] the U.S.
Attorney’s Office continuing commitment to hold all responsible parties
to account for the submission of claims to federal health care programs
that are tainted by unlawful kickback arrangements” and the government
claimed the “settlement sends a clear message about [law enforcement’s]
unwavering commitment” to protect government health care programs.74
The clarity of this message is put into serious question by the fact that on
that same day, a spokesperson for the settling private equity firm told
Bloomberg Law: “There was no admission of wrongdoing . . . but we
concluded that it was in our investors’ best interests to settle and avoid the
cost and distraction of further time-consuming litigation and a jury trial.”75
Again, the case settled for single damages—the defendants paid only
restitution, again without interest, despite the wrongdoing allegedly taking
place four to five years prior to the settlement.76
An analysis conducted for this Article found that with regard to 72 of
the 195 CSAs reviewed, the defendant included an explicit denial in the
CSA or issued a statement at the time of the resolution denying having
engaged in wrongdoing—in many cases attributing the settlement to a
desire to avoid litigation costs. Some made statements more directly
attacking the credibility of the system, with one stating that the company

71. Civil Settlement Agreement, United States ex rel. Mohatt v. Kalispell Reg’l Healthcare Sys.,
No. CV-16-125-M-DWM (D. Mont. Sept. 27, 2018).
72. Civil Settlement Agreement, United States ex rel. Brasher v. Pentec Health, Inc., No. 13-cv05745-ER (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2019) [hereinafter Pentec Settlement].
73. See Genova Settlement, supra note 39, at 2–4.
74. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Compounding Pharmacy, Two of Its Executives, and Private
Equity Firm Agree to Pay $21.36 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Sept. 18, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/compounding-pharmacy-two-its-executives-and-private-equity-firmagree-pay-2136-million [https://perma.cc/PF4R-4CM9].
75. Valerie Bauman, Specialty Pharmacy Pays $21 Million in Anti-Kickback Settlement,
BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 18, 2019, 2:27 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-lifesciences/specialty-pharmacy-pays-21-million-in-anti-kickback-settlement (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
76. Civil Settlement Agreement at 2–3, United States ex rel. Medrano v. Diabetic Care Rx, LLC,
No. 15-62617-CV (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2019).
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was a “victim of allegations,”77 and another stating that they “would have
prevailed” had the case gone to trial.78 Once again seemingly contrary to
the May 2019 FCA Guidance, those seventy-two settlements had an
average multiplier of 1.64—below the mean multiplier of 1.73.79
While FCA resolutions are too fact-specific to reach definitive
statistical conclusions regarding the impact of admissions on FCA
multipliers, there is ample anecdotal evidence creating reason for
skepticism that admissions are a factor that has led to reduced multipliers.
Instead, it appears that although the FCA Guidance is explicit in
distinguishing acceptance of responsibility from mere willingness to
settle, DOJ has rewarded willingness to settle above all else, and without
distinguishing between situations where defendants settle while
continuing to deny wrongdoing from situations involving true acceptance
of responsibility.
III. DOJ CRIMINAL POLICY REQUIRES ADMISSIONS IN
VIRTUALLY ALL CASES
As noted above, DOJ’s policy and practice of requiring admissions of
responsibility in virtually no FCA cases stands in sharp contrast to DOJ’s
policy concerning admissions in criminal cases. Although the FCA has
largely replaced criminal prosecution as a mechanism for DOJ’s
enforcement of health care laws against business entities, DOJ’s
admissions policy in civil cases more closely resembles that of private
civil litigants than that of DOJ in criminal cases. In criminal cases, DOJ
has, with few exceptions, insisted on acceptance of responsibility as a
condition for resolving cases. Typical criminal pleas involve defendants
admitting their guilt as part of the process by which the court determines
that there is a factual basis for the plea.80
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendants may, with
the court’s consent, resolve cases without making admissions via a nolo
contendere plea.81 Defendants who plead nolo contendere are sentenced
no differently than those who have accepted responsibility, with the
primary concrete difference being that the plea cannot be used against the
77. Brooke Kansier, Medical Provider Resolves Fraud Allegations, Pays $600k to Federal
Government, TRAVERSE CITY REC. EAGLE (Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.recordeagle.com/news/local_news/medical-provider-resolves-fraud-allegations-pays-600k-to-federalgovernment/article_d2696400-ec69-11e9-963d-1fc30eda66f5.html [https://perma.cc/W72Z-UPE3].
78. Brown, supra note 51.
79. The analysis includes multipliers from sixty of the seventy-two cases. The multiplier was not
calculable for the other twelve cases.
80. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(3).
81. Id. 11(a)(1).
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defendant as an admission in a subsequent criminal or civil case.82 In
addition to the implications for future litigation, many defendants would
also simply prefer, if given the choice, to avoid admitting wrongdoing.83
DOJ policy, however, strongly opposes the use of nolo contendere pleas.
The relevant Justice Manual section titled “Offers to Plead Nolo
Contendere—Opposition Except in Unusual Circumstances,” notes that
DOJ “has long attempted to discourage the disposition of criminal cases
by means of nolo pleas,” and states:
Government attorneys have been instructed for many years not to
consent to nolo pleas except in the most unusual circumstances,
and to do so then only with Departmental approval. Federal
prosecutors should oppose the acceptance of a nolo plea, unless
the United States Attorney and the appropriate Assistant Attorney
General concludes that the circumstances are so unusual that
acceptance of the plea would be in the public interest.84
The Justice Manual goes on to direct DOJ attorneys to make “a forceful
presentation” arguing in opposition to any defendant’s request for a nolo
contendere plea, in order to “make it clear to the public that the
government is unwilling to condone the entry of a special plea that may
help the defendant avoid legitimate consequences of his/her guilt.”85
The Justice Manual sections instructing against the use of nolo
contendere pleas apply with equal force to prosecutions of business
organizations, and DOJ has generally not strayed from the admission
requirement even when allowing a Deferred Prosecution Agreement
(DPA), or even a Non-prosecution Agreement (NPA) rather than
requiring a guilty plea.86 DOJ explicitly states that, even when
consideration of the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations (Corporate Resolution Principles) leads DOJ to permit a
DPA or an NPA instead of a guilty plea, it is critically important that the
resolution include acceptance of responsibility, as noted in a speech by
then Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer:
One of the reasons why deferred prosecution agreements are such
a powerful tool is that, in many ways, a DPA has the same
punitive, deterrent, and rehabilitative effect as a guilty plea: when
a company enters into a DPA with the government, or an NPA for
82. See FED. R. EVID. 803(22)(A); Nathan B. Lenvin & Ernest S. Meyers, Nolo Contendere: Its
Nature and Implications, 51 YALE L.J. 1255, 1263 (1942).
83. See, e.g., Lenvin & Meyers, supra note 82, at 1263 (noting that defendants can avoid “the
stigma attached to a guilty plea or conviction after trial” by entering a nolo contendere plea).
84. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.500 (2018); see also id. § 9-16.010 (2020).
85. Id. § 9-27.530 (2018).
86. See id. § 9-28.200 (2020).
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that matter, it almost always must acknowledge wrongdoing,
agree to cooperate with the government’s investigation, pay a
fine, agree to improve its compliance program, and agree to face
prosecution if it fails to satisfy the terms of the agreement. All of
these components of DPAs are critical for accountability.87
Yet, nowhere in the Justice Manual or otherwise has DOJ provided an
explanation as to why there should be a different policy as to admissions
in criminal cases than in FCA cases, where corporate defendants (and
third-parties) have similar concerns regarding follow-on litigation.
DOJ policy in criminal cases similarly includes strong opposition to the
use of Alford pleas, where a defendant pleads guilty but maintains his or
her innocence.88 As with nolo contendere pleas, Alford pleas are
forbidden “except in the most unusual of circumstances and only after
recommendation for doing so has been approved by the Assistant
Attorney General responsible for the subject matter or by the Associate
Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or the Attorney
General.”89 The Justice Manual instructs DOJ attorneys in such cases to
“make an offer of proof of all facts known to the Government to support
the conclusion that the defendant is in fact guilty.”90
The Justice Manual includes a rationale for rejecting Alford pleas that
would seemingly apply with equal force to FCA settlements:
[I]t is often preferable to have a jury resolve the factual and legal
dispute between the government and the defendant, rather than
have government attorneys encourage defendants to plead guilty
under circumstances that the public might regard as questionable
or unfair. . . . [A]ttorneys for the government in Alford cases
should endeavor to establish as strong a factual basis for the plea
as possible not only to satisfy the requirement of Rule 11(b)(3),
but also to minimize the adverse effects of Alford pleas on public
perceptions of the administration of justice.91
Yet, again, nowhere in the Justice Manual or otherwise has DOJ
provided an explanation as to why FCA defendants are permitted to deny
wrongdoing, despite DOJ’s understanding that such denials may
negatively impact public perceptions of the administration of justice.

87. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Address at the New York City Bar
Association (Sept. 13, 2012) (emphasis added), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/
crm-speech-1209131.html [https://perma.cc/E84M-Q6Y6].
88. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
89. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-16.015 (2020); see also id. § 9-27.440 (2018).
90. Id. § 9-16.015.
91. Id. § 9-27.440.
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IV. THE SEC’S MUCH-MALIGNED “NEITHER ADMIT NOR
DENY” POLICY GOES FURTHER THAN DOJ’S FCA
PRACTICE
To date, there has been no meaningful criticism, or even public
discussion, of DOJ’s no admissions policy in FCA cases. There has,
however, been substantial controversy over the lack of admissions in
settlements between corporate entities and the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
There are clear parallels between the role of FCA settlements as an
enforcement tool against health care fraud and the role of SEC settlements
as an enforcement tool against financial misconduct. Just as DOJ’s civil
components play a far greater role in regulating the health care industry
through FCA settlements than its criminal components do through
criminal prosecutions, enforcement of financial misconduct is more
frequently handled through civil SEC enforcement than through criminal
prosecution by DOJ. And as with FCA cases, “the vast majority” of SEC
cases settle rather than proceed to litigation.92
SEC’s settlements historically did not require defendants to make
admissions, as with FCA settlements, though the SEC policy forbade
denials of liability, unlike FCA settlements, and recent policy changes
have tightened SEC settlement policy even further. For decades, the
SEC’s typical settlement included language that the defendant would
“neither admit nor deny” wrongdoing—defendants were not required to
admit they had engaged in the alleged wrongdoing, but they were also
barred from denying it.93
In 1972, the SEC announced the policy change that codified the
“neither admit nor deny” language:
[The SEC will not] permit a defendant or respondent to consent
to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the
allegations in the complaint or order for proceedings. In this
regard, the Commission believes that a refusal to admit the
allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the defendant or

92. Aulana L. Peters, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Washington Bar
Association: SEC Litigation: Thoughts on When to Settle and Try Cases (Apr. 17, 1985),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1985/041985peters.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB5R-CRVV]; see also
Mary L. Schapiro, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the Twentieth Annual
Securities Regulation Institute: New SEC Enforcement Remedies (Jan. 20, 1993),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1993/012093schapiro.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SQP-YKEF]
(describing that the SEC “instituted approximately seventy-four cease-and-desist actions [that
year] . . . almost all of which [were] settled by consent”).
93. See Theodore D. Edwards, Of Truth, Pragmatism, and Sour Grapes: The Second Circuit’s
Decision in SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, 65 DUKE L.J. 1241, 1259 (2016).
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respondent states that he neither admits nor denies
the allegations.94
As Judge Rakoff detailed in SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp.,95 the
SEC’s focus in addressing the language in 1972 was not on allowing
defendants to settle without admissions but on forbidding settling
defendants from denying the allegations publicly.96 Prior to the 1972
policy pronouncement, the “neither admit nor deny” language was already
in regular use in SEC settlement agreements but was taken to mean only
within the agreement itself. Prior to 1972, defendants regularly did exactly
what many FCA defendants do now—publicly deny what SEC had
accused them of doing. Thus, in addition to the above language, the SEC
began, in 1972, requiring that a defendant who agreed to a consent
judgment using the “neither admit nor deny” language not publicly deny
the allegations—the SEC began including language in consent judgments
that the defendant agrees “not to take any action or to make or permit to
be made any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any
allegation in the complaint or creating the impression that the complaint
is without factual basis.”97
In announcing the 1972 policy change, the SEC noted “it is important
to avoid creating, or permitting to be created, an impression that a decree
is being entered or a sanction imposed, when the conduct alleged did not,
in fact, occur.”98
In a pair of cases in 2011, Southern District of New York Judge Jed
Rakoff took aim at the SEC’s use of “neither admit nor deny”

94. Consent Decrees in Judicial or Administrative Proceedings, Securities Act Release No. 33–
5337, 37 Fed. Reg. 25,224 (Nov. 28, 1972) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (2020)). Typical
language includes the following:
Defendant understands and agrees to comply with the Commission’s policy “not to permit a
defendant or respondent to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying
the allegations in the complaint or order for proceedings.” 17 C.F.R. § 202.5. In compliance with
this policy, Defendant agrees: (i) not to take any action or to make or permit to be made any
public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint or creating the
impression that the complaint is without factual basis; and (ii) that upon the filing of this
Consent, Defendant hereby withdraws any papers filed in this action to the extent that they deny
any allegation in the complaint. If Defendant breaches this agreement, the Commission may
petition the Court to vacate the Final Judgment and restore this action to its active docket.
Nothing in this paragraph affects Defendant’s: (i) testimonial obligations; or (ii) right to take
legal or factual positions in litigation or other legal proceedings in which the Commission is not
a party.
Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co. at 8–9, SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV3229 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2010).
95. 771 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
96. Id. at 308–09.
97. Id. (describing the history of the SEC’s “neither admit nor deny” policy).
98. Consent Decrees in Judicial or Administrative Proceedings, Securities Act Release No. 33–
5337, 37 Fed. Reg. 25,224.
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settlements.99 Numerous commentators followed suit, the House
Committee on Financial Services conducted a hearing on the subject, and
the SEC announced in 2013 changes in the policy so as to require
admissions in more cases.
Notably, as detailed above, even before Judge Rakoff’s intervention
and the SEC’s subsequent policy shift in 2013, the SEC’s settlement
policy had for decades been significantly more restrictive than DOJ’s
FCA settlement policy—unlike FCA defendants, SEC defendants have,
for almost forty years, been prevented from publicly denying the
allegations underlying their settlements.
It was that more restrictive policy that Judge Rakoff sharply criticized
in Vitesse and, more notably, in SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.100
In Vitesse, Judge Rakoff described the result as “a stew of confusion and
hypocrisy.”101 Rakoff argued the policy amounted to a “disservice to the
public” because it wrongly prevented the public from knowing whether or
not the SEC’s charges were true, and noted DOJ’s criminal policy against
allowing nolo contendere pleas, discussed above in Part III.102
In Citigroup, Judge Rakoff reiterated the concerns he’d expressed in
Vitesse, but went further by refusing to approve the proposed consent
judgment.103 Judge Rakoff held that without “a sufficient evidentiary
basis” he could not determine the consent judgment to be “fair,
reasonable, adequate, and in the public interest”—in the absence of
admissions, Judge Rakoff held the court needed some other way to
determine the true facts at issue.104 Judge Rakoff also found that consent
judgments without admissions and with modest penalties were
“frequently viewed, particularly in the business community, as a cost of
doing business imposed by having to maintain a working relationship with
a regulatory agency, rather than as any indication of where the real
truth lies.”105
Scholars joined Judge Rakoff in criticizing the SEC’s use of “neither
admit nor deny” resolutions, with one scholar writing, “[t]here is
something troubling about a public enforcement action that ends with a
conclusion of ‘maybe he (they) did it, maybe he (they) didn’t, but he’s
99. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Vitesse, 771 F.
Supp. 2d 304.
100. 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
101. Vitesse, 771 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
102. Id.
103. Citigroup, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335.
104. Id. at 330–32 (referring to the standard of review set forth by Judge Rakoff in SEC v. Bank of
America Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
105. Id. at 333.
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(they are) paying a price for it in any event.’”106
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals eventually reversed Judge
Rakoff’s decision refusing to approve the consent decree, holding that he
had abused his discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard both
when assessing the consent decree and when requiring the SEC to
establish the “truth” of the allegations.107 The Second Circuit omitted
“adequacy” from the standard to be applied by judges reviewing proposed
consent judgments,108 and clarified the “public interest” analysis to be one
aimed solely at assuring that the “public interest would not be disserved,”
which the district court could not define as “an overriding interest in
knowing the truth.”109
Between Judge Rakoff’s Citigroup decision and the Second Circuit’s
reversal, however, the SEC announced two changes to its “neither admit
nor deny” settlement policy. First, in January 2012, the SEC announced
that defendants will have to make admissions as part of their SEC
resolutions if they have been found guilty or admitted wrongdoing in
parallel criminal cases.110 Second, and more significantly, in June 2013,
the SEC announced that it would begin requiring admissions “in
appropriate cases,” which SEC Chair Mary Jo White later described as
including:
• Cases where a large number of investors have been harmed or
the conduct was otherwise egregious.
• Cases where the conduct posed a significant risk to the market
or investors.
• Cases where admissions would aid investors deciding whether
to deal with a particular party in the future.
• Cases where reciting unambiguous facts would send an
important message to the market about a particular case.111

106. Buell, supra note 7, at 510.
107. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 752 F.3d 285, 295 (2d Cir. 2014).
108. Id. at 294–97.
109. Id. at 296–97.
110. Public Statement, Robert Khuzami, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Public Statement by SEC
Staff: Recent Policy Change (Jan. 7, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/
PublicStmt/1365171489600#.UrjmY0KhDzI [https://perma.cc/PQ4Q-6Y4Z].
111. White, Speech at the Council of Institutional Investors, supra note 8; White, Speech at NYU,
supra note 8. The SEC denied that Judge Rakoff or his Citigroup decision had influenced the change
in policy, but given the timing, that denial was understandably met with skepticism. Interestingly,
SEC Chair Mary Jo White stated that even before Judge Rakoff’s rulings, she took note of the “neither
admit nor deny” policy because it conflicted with her experience as a United States Attorney, given
DOJ’s policy requiring admissions in criminal cases, as detailed above. James B. Stewart, S.E.C. Has
a Message for Firms Not Used to Admitting Guilt, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2013),
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White made clear that the new policy would only apply to particular
cases, and the “neither admit nor deny” settlements would continue to be
“a very important tool in our enforcement arsenal that we will continue to
use when we believe it is in public interest to do so.”112
It is likely that DOJ’s criminal law policy, and the reasons for it, led to
the criticism and ultimate adjustment to the SEC’s policy. Judge Rakoff
himself served as a federal prosecutor, and Mary Jo White, who served as
SEC Chair from 2013 through 2017, attributed her support for the change
in policy not to Judge Rakoff’s criticism but to her background in criminal
law, including as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York.113
White’s prediction—that admissions would be sought in some cases
while “neither admit nor deny” settlements would continue to be heavily
used—has proven true over the past seven years. While White stated in
November 2016 that the SEC had obtained admissions from seventyseven defendants during the three years since the policy shift,114 critics
have questioned the extent to which the SEC’s 2013 policy change has
impacted a meaningful percentage of SEC’s resolutions, and pressure
remains on the SEC to seek admissions in more cases.115 However far the
SEC has moved since 2013 towards demanding admissions, and however
much further the SEC might go, it has been nearly fifty years since the
SEC forbade the type of denials commonly made by FCA defendants.
V.

DOJ’S LACK OF A POLICY FAVORING ADMISSIONS
THREATENS TO UNDERMINE ITS ENFORCEMENT GOALS
One goal of DOJ’s FCA efforts is, of course, the recovery of money.116

https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/business/secs-new-chief-promises-tougher-line-on-cases.html
[https://perma.cc/7A47-8HTH].
112. White, Speech at the Council of Institutional Investors, supra note 8.
113. See White, Speech at NYU, supra note 8 (“My views on this are, of course, informed by my
experience as a federal prosecutor where criminal defendants—individuals or entities—must
voluntarily admit their guilt if they agree to plead guilty.”).
Scholars have been skeptical of White’s claim that the changes were not, at least in part, a result of
Judge Rakoff’s urging. Coffee, supra note 9 (“Whatever the outcome in the SEC’s mandamus appeal
of Judge Jed S. Rakoff’s Citigroup decision, Rakoff has effectively won the war, even if he loses the
Citigroup battle.”).
114. White, Speech at NYU, supra note 8.
115. See Winship & Robbennolt, supra note 7, at 1116–17 (collecting criticism of SEC’s use of
admissions post-2013 policy shift); see also Winship & Robbennolt, supra note 9, at 50 (concluding
that very few SEC resolutions contained admissions even after the 2013 policy shift); Rosenfeld,
supra note 9.
116. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers Over $3 Billion from
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Jan. 21, 2020) [hereinafter DOJ Jan. 21, 2020 Press
Release], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-false-claimsact-cases-fiscal-year-2019 [https://perma.cc/D6SJ-NPDZ].
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Between 2010 and 2019, DOJ recovered approximately $25.3 billion from
settlements and judgments in FCA cases involving the health care
industry.117 Settlements, even absent admissions, do result in significant
monetary recovery in an absolute sense. But the failure to seek the full
scope of treble damages plus penalties permitted under the FCA suggests
that DOJ is not motivated by seeking maximum recovery. Moreover, DOJ
has made clear that its focus is not only on recovering money—an
unsurprising fact given that the roughly $2 billion recovered annually
through health care FCA cases is approximately 0.2% of the more than
$1.4 trillion the federal government spent on Medicare and Medicaid
alone in 2019, and roughly 0.05% of the approximately $3.8 trillion in
National Health Expenditure in 2019.118
Instead, DOJ has highlighted the presumed deterrent impact of its FCA
enforcement efforts. In its December 2018 press release announcing
DOJ’s Fiscal Year 2018 recoveries, DOJ noted “the Department’s
vigorous pursuit of health care fraud prevents billions . . . in losses by
deterring those who might otherwise try to cheat the system for their own
gain.”119 DOJ has sought to deter wrongdoing both through pure economic
coercion—incentivizing profit-maximizing companies to follow the law
in order to avoid punishment—and in other ways as well. Two methods
have held particular prominence in DOJ statements, and are thus
discussed separately here—incentivizing cooperation and creating a
culture of compliance in the health care industry. As discussed below,
whether examined from an economic analysis perspective or through the
lens of the psychology of legal authority, DOJ’s goals of deterrence and
of incentivizing cooperation are thwarted by its failure to require
admissions and its willingness to allow defendants to deny wrongdoing at
the time of settlement.
A.

Deterrence

DOJ’s current policies undercut its deterrence goals in two seemingly
opposite ways. First, most FCA settlements are surprisingly lenient given
the potential power of the FCA—very few cases resolve for more than
117. CIV. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FALSE CLAIMS ACT STATISTICS 3 (Dec. 21, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/civil/page/file/1080696/download [https://perma.cc/5HR6-KAK4] (health
and human services); DOJ Jan. 21, 2020 Press Release, supra note 116.
118. National Health Expenditure Data, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Dec. 16,
2020), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/
NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical [https://perma.cc/VW8N-8E5A];
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE 2019 HIGHLIGHTS 2,
https://www.cms.gov/files/document/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQ9H-LTM3].
119. DOJ Dec. 21, 2018 Press Release, supra note 17.
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double damages, while scholars have suggested that even treble damages
and penalties are likely “too mild rather than too severe” and that “[t]o
settle false claims cases routinely for significantly less ‘than the legally
authorized penalties’ is to undermine even optimal deterrence and to risk
encouraging improper billing.”120 A large number of FCA settlements
recovered no more—and often less—than the amount of damages plus
interest.121 There is thus ample reason for concern that DOJ’s FCA
settlements are too lenient to achieve deterrence, instead sending the
message that, even as payment for wrongdoing, they are an acceptable
cost of doing business. In that context, the failure to require admissions is
problematic because such settlements reduce the penalties for wrongdoing
that come not from the financial component but from collateral
consequences, including the reputational impact of being found to have
broken the rules. Moreover, resolutions without admissions can leave
enforcers vulnerable to accusations of being inappropriately lenient
on wrongdoers.122
But DOJ’s policy to not require admissions, and indeed to allow denials
of wrongdoing, is potentially even more harmful than the seemingly
lenient financial components to FCA settlements. While scholars have
debated whether the goal of general deterrence should be complete or
optimal deterrence, all forms of penalty-based deterrence require potential
wrongdoers to believe that potential penalties are tied to wrongdoing.123
Put simply, deterrence is undermined if the parties to be deterred believe
the government may require them to pay a penalty whether they engage
in wrongdoing or not, and will not require them to pay a greater penalty
for greater wrongdoing.
Because DOJ consistently threatens treble damages and penalties in
order to obtain settlements from defendants for what end up being greatly
reduced penalties, observers—including other health care providers
deciding upon future conduct—may find it plausible that defendants are
resolving cases not because they committed misconduct and would lose
at trial. Instead, they may conclude that defendants are resolving cases
because the government has threatened severe penalties and transaction
costs that could be imposed through trial, and then allowed them to evade
120. Jost & Davies, supra note 13, at 308.
121. Elberg, supra note 1, at 1196. The deterrent value of amounts paid are further reduced by the
tax deductibility of amounts paid as restitution.
122. Buell, supra note 7, at 511 (referring to the “the reputational or stigmatic effects of liability”);
Winship & Robbennolt, supra note 7, at 1126 (suggesting that admissions in civil enforcement “can
help to foster a sense among the public that the agency enforcement has teeth”).
123. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1538–51 (1984); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—And What Can Be
Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1876–77 (1992).
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that severe punishment by agreeing to a slap on the wrist without any need
to admit wrongdoing.124 That scenario seems all the more plausible when
defendants freely and publicly proclaim, when resolving cases, that that
is precisely what is happening.
While it may be in some cases, to some observers, that the settlement
payment itself constitutes something of an admission—then-Attorney
General of New York Eliot Spitzer once remarked, “[y]ou don’t pay a
$100 million fine if you didn’t do anything wrong”125—such statements
ignore the reality that, as noted above,126 only a small number of FCA
settlements are of the size where Spitzer’s maxim would apply, even were
it credible.127 And for the largest companies, $100 million may not be
particularly significant, especially when compared to government threats
of lengthy litigation followed by the potential for a jury verdict several
times that amount.128
Cynical observers can come up with a long list of motivations that
could pull FCA prosecutors consciously or subconsciously from their
responsibility to seek settlements only from guilty defendants. Professor
Samuel W. Buell, himself a former prosecutor, noted the potential for such
pressures in the SEC context. While “[a]ssum[ing] it is not true” that
prosecutors are so driven, he observed that “enforcers like settlements for
boosting case statistics, generating press conferences, yielding checks
with lots of zeros attached, and building credibility with a defense bar that
typically hires enforcement attorneys to their next and higher-paying
jobs.”129 Applying the same assumption, such motivations would likely
apply to seeking settlements in the absence of wrongdoing.
While Buell was writing about SEC enforcers, FCA enforcers arguably
have an additional motivation to be aggressive in pursuing resolutions,
potentially to the point of seeking settlements in the absence of
wrongdoing—the mechanics of the qui tam system, through which many
FCA cases originate with private whistleblowers. Qui tams filed by
whistleblowers regularly account for a large majority of FCA actions and
124. This is particularly true in health care FCA matters, where settlements regularly involve
defendants not only buying peace from DOJ, but also resolving a potential exclusion action by HHSOIG without a period of exclusion.
125. Patrick McGeehan, $100 Million Fine for Merrill Lynch, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/22/business/100-million-fine-for-merrill-lynch.html
[https://perma.cc/7KA6-TN4L].
126. See supra section II.A and Figure 1.
127. Judge Rakoff dismissed the SEC’s proposed $33 million as “a trivial penalty.” SEC v. Bank
of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Of the 209 health care FCA settlements
over the past two years, 192 were below $33 million. See supra section II.A and Figure 1.
128. McGeehan, supra note 125.
129. Buell, supra note 7, at 518.
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recoveries.130 Because relators’ counsel control in which district an FCA
suit will be filed and thus which U.S. Attorney’s Office will be assigned
to work on the case, DOJ officials are aware that what they do—whether
taking aggressive positions on cases or otherwise—will impact how their
district is viewed by the attorneys who represent qui tam relators, and thus
whether the district is attractive for such suits.131 And the health care
industry and the defense bar have additional reason to be skeptical of the
origin of cases—it is widely known that most FCA cases originate with
whistleblowers who stand to gain between 15–30% of the government’s
recovery,132 again giving the cynical observer reason to doubt the
legitimacy of the government’s claims.
Such skepticism is furthered in the FCA context by the lack of detailed
factual allegations contained in settlement agreements and DOJ press
releases. Unlike in the SEC context, where the SEC regularly recounts
lengthy, detailed factual allegations—the much-debated proposed
settlement in Citigroup contained twenty pages of allegations—none of
the FCA CSAs analyzed contained detailed allegations including the
evidence supporting the government’s case, with most including
allegations of no more than a few sentences.133
130. The rise in FCA cases, particularly in the area of health care fraud, can be traced back to
amendments to the FCA in 1986, which provided substantial incentives for whistleblowers (referred
to as “relators”) to file qui tam lawsuits on behalf of the government alleging false claims. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730. Relators can recover between 15–30% of the proceeds of a resolution, depending on whether
the government elects to take the case over from the relator (this is referred to as the government
“intervening”) or if the relator proceeds without government intervention, and also depending “upon
the extent to which the person [i.e., the relator] substantially contributed to the prosecution of the
action.” Id. § 3730(d).
In Fiscal Year 2019, relators filed 633 such qui tam suits, $2.1 billion of the $3 billion recovered
in Fiscal Year 2019 was attributable to qui tams, and the government paid out $265 million to relators.
DOJ Jan. 9, 2020 Press Release, supra note 10. Although only roughly one-quarter of filed qui tams
are successful, they regularly account for a large majority of FCA actions and recoveries. BARRY R.
FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, ROBERT L.
SCHWARTZ, BRIETTA R. CLARK, ERIN C. FUSE BROWN, ROBERT GATTER, JAIME S. KING &
ELIZABETH PENDO, HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 904 (8th ed. 2018).
131. One recently departing U.S. Attorney touted his achievement in leading his district to
“becom[e] a favored environment for Qui Tam lawsuits.” Press Release, U.S. Att’ys’ Off. N. Dist.
Iowa, Dep’t of Just., After Nearly 23 Years with the Department of Justice, United States Attorney
Deegan Announces Retirement (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndia/pr/after-nearly-23years-department-justice-united-states-attorney-deegan-announces [https://perma.cc/F2RB-8262].
132. DOJ Jan. 9, 2020 Press Release, supra note 10 (noting that qui tam actions “comprise a
significant percentage of the False Claims Act cases that are filed,” and that qui tam actions accounted
for $2.1 billion of the $3 billion recovered by DOJ from FCA actions in Fiscal Year 2019).
133. Complaint at 1–20, SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(No. 11 Civ. 7387); see, e.g., LifeCare Settlement, supra note 56, at 1 (describing Covered Conduct
as “submission of claims to Medicare for non-emergency basic life support ambulance services and
non-emergency advanced life support ambulance services . . . that were not medically reasonable or
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Professors Verity Winship and Jennifer K. Robbennolt have argued
that where such detailed allegations are present, “[i]t is not
clear . . . whether the nonlawyer public distinguishes between a complaint
or consent decree that details the wrongdoing, but does not include
admissions, and an agreement that both details and admits the
allegations.”134 From their perspective, DOJ’s practice of not including
detailed allegations would presumably be almost as significant a harm as
DOJ’s failure to obtain admissions or its allowance of denials—it is the
combination of these practices that exposes DOJ to allegations of forcing
meritless settlements.135
B.

Legitimacy

The greatest harm from DOJ’s lack of admissions may flow not from
its impact on deterrence in the form of a direct effect on compliance
decisions made by health care entities but on the implication for the
fundamental legitimacy of the health care fraud legal system. DOJ has
regularly spoken of the idea that fraud, particularly in the health care
industry, can be reduced through shared values rather than solely through
threats of enforcement from DOJ. As Assistant Attorney General Brian
A. Benczkowski told a room full of health care compliance professionals
in 2019:
The Department greatly values the role of the corporate
compliance community. Every day, you work hard to reinforce
legal and regulatory compliance and ethical behavior in business
organizations, work that benefits all of us.
The role of the federal prosecutor is, of course, different from
that of a corporate compliance professional, but in many ways our
goals are aligned. We both want to deter corporate criminal
misconduct, and we both want to detect such misconduct when it
does occur, holding wrongdoers to account in our
respective ways.
With apologies for repeating a cliché—the corporate
compliance function is in some ways more important than the

necessary and/or were not supported by the medical record,” and without providing any additional
details regarding the alleged wrongdoing or evidence supporting the government’s allegations);
Pentec Settlement, supra note 72, at 2 (describing Covered Conduct of three separate allegations in a
total of three sentences and without providing any evidence supporting the government’s allegations);
UTC Settlement, supra note 70, at 3–4 (describing Covered Conduct of three separate allegations in
a total of one paragraph and without providing any evidence supporting the government’s allegations).
134. Winship & Robbennolt, supra note 7, at 1099–100.
135. Id.
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prosecution function.136
Of course, such hopes are pinned on the industry believing DOJ’s claim
that their “goals are aligned.”137 DOJ cannot hope to make allies of
compliance professionals if the industry believes DOJ’s goal is not
addressing fraud but collecting settlement dollars and press releases,
wooing relators’ counsel, and preparing for future employment in the
private sector.
Commentators have expressed two distinct lines of criticism arising
from concerns regarding legitimacy of enforcement resolutions that do not
include admissions. First, one concern is that observers will view
resolutions without admissions as weak, as a practical matter, because of
a failure to achieve accountability.138 It is that concern that has seemingly
driven critics of the SEC’s no-admission policy.139 The second, more
fundamental concern is that observers will view resolutions without
admissions as deeply suspect, reflecting inappropriate use of the
government’s authority. It is this second concern that strikes at the heart
of critiques about DOJ’s use of the FCA.140
Historically, concerns about the legitimacy of DOJ’s FCA enforcement
have focused not on the structure of DOJ resolutions and on the practical
implications of such settlements, but on what was viewed as government’s
problematic expansion of theories underlying FCA cases against health
care defendants. Almost twenty years ago, Professor Joan H. Krause
examined the health care “industry’s distrust of FCA
enforcement . . . [and its] important implications for the future of the
health care anti-fraud agenda.”141 While noting that the “single most
important determinant of legitimacy is procedural justice: whether the
legal system treats parties fairly and with respect, even when they do not
prevail,” Krause’s focus was on the substantive—Krause expressed
concern that, as theories of FCA liability expanded, health care defendants

136. Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks
at the 20th Annual Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Compliance Congress (Nov. 6, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-brian-benczkowski-delivers-remarks20th-annual-pharmaceutical [https://perma.cc/7Y6K-2X6R].
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Winship & Robbennolt, supra note 7, at 1126 (obtaining admissions “can help to
foster a sense among the public that the agency enforcement has teeth”).
139. Id.
140. Both concerns are reflected in DOJ’s language instructing criminal prosecutors to object to
nolo contendere and Alford pleas. See supra Part III.
141. Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government Harm
Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 127 (2001).
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would view enforcement as illegitimate.142 Krause pointed to theorists’
arguments that “the perceived legitimacy and moral credibility of the law
are crucial to effective crime control because they influence conduct
through normative—rather than coercive—forces.”143 Even where there is
seemingly sufficient enforcement to create deterrence, Krause concluded,
“lack of legitimacy is likely to lead to greater noncompliance.”144
As Krause detailed, critics have argued that DOJ’s FCA theories have
expanded because the potentially exorbitant penalties under the FCA (as
well as potential exclusion from participation in government health care
programs) lead defendants to settle cases they could potentially win at
trial.145 Whether those critics are right or wrong, the perceptions of
industry and the defense bar may be as important as the reality given the
extent to which DOJ relies on its legitimacy to achieve its enforcement
goals. Two areas of particular focus to the government—incentivizing
cooperation and creating a culture of compliance in the health care
industry—are particularly harmed by perceptions of illegitimacy, as
demonstrated by recent empirical study of the psychology surrounding the
exercise of legal authority. Because, as discussed above, failure to require
admissions, and worse yet allowing denials, threaten the perceived
legitimacy of the FCA enforcement system, there is reason for concern
that they consequently threaten DOJ’s efforts to incentivize cooperation
and promote a culture of compliance.
1.

Incentivizing Cooperation

DOJ has made obtaining cooperation from corporate defendants a focus
of its enforcement efforts, particularly in the wake of Deputy Attorney
General Sally Yates’s memorandum seeking to improve DOJ’s efforts at
obtaining “Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing.”146 The
142. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 162,
178 (1990)).
143. Id. (emphasis in original) (first citing PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE,
LIABILITY AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 202 (1995) (“Our conclusion
is that the moral credibility of the criminal law is its single most important asset.”); and then citing
TYLER, supra note 142, at 22–24 (“Two such bases [for securing public compliance with the law] are
commonly noted: social relations . . . and normative values.”)).
144. Id. at 212.
145. Id. at 204–05.
146. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Assistant
Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., Assistant Att’y Gen., Civ. Div., Assistant Att’y Gen., Crim. Div., Assistant
Att’y Gen., Env’t & Nat’l Sec. Div., Assistant Att’y Gen., Tax Div., Dir., F.B.I., Dir., Exec. Off. for
U.S. Trs., & All U.S. Att’ys (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Yates Memo], https://www.justice.gov/arch
ives/dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc/BG6D-ESRB].
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Yates Memo identified six steps DOJ would take to “strengthen [DOJ’s]
pursuit of individual corporate wrongdoing,” the first of which focused on
detailing under what circumstances corporations can qualify for
cooperation credit under the Corporate Prosecution Principles.147 The
Yates Memo’s explicit instruction to civil prosecutors to take corporate
cooperation into account ended years of speculation about whether
cooperation was valued by DOJ’s civil components, and has led to a series
of changes to DOJ policy language, culminating most recently and most
significantly in a May 2019 statement from Assistant Attorney General
Jody Hunt and accompanying changes to the Justice Manual.148 These
changes amount to formal guidance that DOJ would reduce the FCA
multiplier for damages recovered in a settlement based on the defendant’s
cooperation during the litigation and settlement process.
These efforts stem from DOJ’s belief (and public criticism) that
corporate enforcement is not enough—individual enforcement must be an
important part of DOJ’s efforts—and that obtaining fulsome cooperation
from corporate defendants is a key component to successful individual
prosecutions.149 Since the 2015 Yates Memo, DOJ’s efforts to incentivize
cooperation have taken the form of speeches promising more favorable
resolutions following cooperation, and guidance documenting those
promises.150 Adding to legitimacy concerns, DOJ’s efforts to obtain
cooperation likely suffer from the inability of industry and the defense bar
to see tangible benefits for cooperation in FCA resolutions—in fact, the

The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations describes cooperation as “a
mitigating factor, by which a corporation . . . can gain credit in a case . . . [by, among other things]
identify[ing] all individuals substantially involved in or responsible for the misconduct at issue.” U.S.
Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-28.700 (2019) (the value of cooperation).
147. Id.
148. DOJ May 7, 2019 Press Release, supra note 3; U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Manual § 4-4.112
(2019) [hereinafter FCA Guidance].
149. Yates Memo, supra note 146, at 1 (“One of the most effective ways to combat corporate
misconduct is by seeking accountability from the individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing. Such
accountability is important for several reasons: it deters future illegal activity, it incentivizes changes
in corporate behavior, it ensures that the proper parties are held responsible for their actions, and it
promotes the public’s confidence in our justice system.”). Not surprisingly, the first, and longest,
section of the Yates Memo focused on cooperation by corporate defendants.
150. See Jesse Panuccio, Assoc. Att’y Gen., Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the
American Bar Association’s 12th National Institute on the Civil False Claims Act and Qui Tam
Enforcement (June 14, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-associate-attorney-generaljesse-panuccio-delivers-remarks-american-bar [https://perma.cc/BG5F-4CMY]; Stephen Cox,
Deputy Assoc. Att’y Gen., Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the
2019 Advanced Forum on False Claims and Qui Tam Enforcement (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.just
ice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-associate-attorney-general-stephen-cox-delivers-remarks-2019-advanced
-forum-false [https://perma.cc/JXK3-D5VL]; FCA Guidance, supra note 148; U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Just. Manual § 9-28.000 (2015) (Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations).
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details of those resolutions give observers reason to be skeptical that
cooperation is in fact meaningfully rewarded by DOJ in the settlement
process.151 But seemingly little attention has been paid to what may be an
additional roadblock to DOJ’s efforts to obtain cooperation—industry and
the defense bar’s perception that DOJ is generally acting illegitimately in
FCA prosecutions.
Cooperation involves not only a cold cost-benefit calculus of the likely
practical consequences of potential enforcement, but also a more general,
attitudinal willingness to aid law enforcement’s efforts arising from the
perceived legitimacy of the enforcement system. Professors Tom R. Tyler
and Jonathan Jackson’s recent research demonstrated a connection
between belief in the legitimacy of legal authorities and a willingness to
cooperate in those authorities’ investigations, bolstering prior studies
tying legitimacy to cooperation.152 Participants in their study were asked
a series of questions on a variety of topics—including questions aimed at
measuring their views of the legitimacy of law enforcement—as well as
their willingness to engage in certain behaviors. Tyler and Jackson’s
regression analysis found that those who viewed legal authorities as more
legitimate were more likely to report crime and criminals, and to
cooperate with the legal system in prosecuting criminals.153
Unfortunately for DOJ, these two concerns—that DOJ does not keep
its promises to reward cooperation and that DOJ uses its substantial
leverage to obtain settlements even in the absence of wrongdoing—go
hand-in-hand, and both give industry and the defense bar reasons not to
provide DOJ the cooperation it clearly wants and needs to achieve its
enforcement goals.
2.

Creating a Culture of Compliance in the Health Care Industry

Beyond law enforcement efforts to deter misconduct or encourage
cooperation through the cost-benefit analysis corporate actors are likely
to consider, studies have shown that legal authorities can motivate
compliance (like cooperation) when the public views the law and law
enforcement as legitimate and thus feel an obligation to follow the rules.154
DOJ and congressional supporters of the FCA have expressed confidence
151. Elberg, supra note 1, at 1203, 1210 (providing examples of FCA CSAs in which the defendant
entity cooperated but seemingly did not receive a reduced damages multiplier).
152. Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority:
Motivating Compliance, Cooperation, and Engagement, 20 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 78 (2014); Ben
Bradford, Policing and Social Identity: Procedural Justice, Inclusion, and Cooperation Between
Police and Public, 24 POLICING & SOC’Y 22 (2014).
153. Tyler & Jackson, supra note 152, at 86.
154. Id. at 79.
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that FCA enforcement has done exactly that. The sponsors of the 1986
amendments to the FCA, which are credited with a rise in FCA cases,
pointed to the law’s impact on “corporate culture”:
Studies estimate the fraud deterred thus far by the qui tam
provisions runs into the hundreds of billions of dollars. Instead of
encouraging or rewarding a culture of deceit, corporations now
spend substantial sums on sophisticated and meaningful
compliance programs. That change in the corporate culture—and
in the values-based decisions that ordinary Americans make daily
in the workplace—may be the law’s most durable legacy.155
DOJ has similarly expressed a belief that corporations are not investing
in compliance simply to avoid punishment from DOJ, but because they
share DOJ’s values and want to follow the rules.156
Tyler and Jackson’s recent study supported Tyler’s previous work
claiming a link between belief in the legitimacy of legal authorities and
willingness to follow the law.157 Their regression analysis found that those
who viewed legal authorities as more legitimate were less likely to engage
in criminal behavior—both major (e.g., fraud) and minor (e.g.,
littering).158 Notably, Tyler and Jackson were able to draw a distinction
between personal morality and normative justification. Their subjects’
willingness to follow the law—both major and minor—was based not
only on their own views of whether “particular behaviors are or are not
immoral” (personal morality), but also “whether legal authorities share
the values, purposes and goals of the community” (normative
justification).159 Assistant Attorney General Benczkowski was thus
correct to speak of DOJ and industry’s shared values, purposes, and goals
as part of DOJ’s efforts to encourage compliance—it is less clear whether
those in the audience believed his claims regarding DOJ’s values to
155. The False Claims Act, TAF EDUC. FUND, https://www.taf.org/false-claims-act
[https://perma.cc/4XFG-TYED] (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley and Rep. Howard Berman).
156. See, e.g., Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Keynote Address at the Ethics and Compliance Initiative (ECI) 2019 Annual Impact Conference (Apr.
30, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-brian-benczkowskidelivers-keynote-address-ethics-and [https://perma.cc/PC42-2KCN] (noting that “the interests of the
Department and private industry to root out corporate crime are very much aligned” and referring to
their “collective efforts”); Stuart Delery, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Remarks at American Bar Association’s 10th National Institute on the Civil False Claims Act and
Qui Tam Enforcement (June 5, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorneygeneral-stuart-delery-delivers-remarks-american-bar-association-s-10th [https://perma.cc/AJK3CMB9] (“[M]ost companies doing business with the government are trying to play by the
rules . . . many companies and individuals do their best to get it right.”).
157. See generally Tyler & Jackson, supra note 152; TYLER, supra note 142.
158. Tyler & Jackson, supra note 152, at 83.
159. Id. at 87.
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be sincere.
While DOJ has been explicit about the potential harm that would result
from allowing no-admission criminal pleas, there has seemingly been no
similar self-reflection when it comes to entering into FCA resolutions with
defendants who admit nothing and instead publicly deny wrongdoing.
DOJ’s expressed fears in the criminal context of undermining public
perceptions of the administration of justice have seemingly come to
fruition in the context of the FCA and health care fraud, leading some to
openly question the legitimacy of DOJ’s corporate health care
enforcement efforts. As detailed above, this comes at a potentially serious
cost to DOJ’s enforcement efforts.
Part VI considers the potential rationales for DOJ’s practice—whether
there is some significant gain by not requiring admissions or some
meaningful harm that would come from a change in policy in this area—
and concludes that any likely concerns are overstated or even misplaced.
VI. POSSIBLE RATIONALES FOR THE NO ADMISSIONS
PRACTICE
Given DOJ’s firm criminal policy against no-admission resolutions, the
well-publicized criticism of the SEC’s “neither admit nor deny”
resolutions, and the detrimental impact on DOJ’s enforcement goals
detailed above, it is natural to wonder why DOJ has adopted and
maintained the practice.
The most likely explanation is offered by Judge Rakoff in reference to
the SEC’s continued use of “neither admit nor deny” settlements when he
posited they are used “presumably for no better reason than that it makes
the settling of cases easier.”160 The SEC has confirmed as much, with the
Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement defending the policy
during testimony before Congress by stating that litigating every case
would lead to fewer enforcement actions, and that defendants would often
refuse to settle cases if admissions were required because they would be
opening themselves up to substantial follow-on litigation by third
parties.161 The SEC has also cited the need to resolve cases quickly and to

160. SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
161. Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 77 (2012) (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of the Division
of Enforcement United States Securities and Exchange Commission). Professor Coffee has noted that
while an admission would likely be inadmissible in a subsequent civil trial, it could still have a
powerful influence on judges ruling on motions to dismiss and would create issues for witnesses
testifying at depositions or at trial. Coffee, supra note 9.
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reduce litigation risk through “neither admit nor deny” settlements.162
Those resource concerns undoubtedly apply similarly to DOJ components
handling FCA cases.
There is, however, one notable difference, which creates greater risk
for the SEC in securities cases than for DOJ in FCA cases. If the SEC
insists on a resolution a defendant will not accept and then loses the case
at trial, it impacts the recovery for victims. Thus, the SEC has an important
reason to be risk-averse: the desire to protect the interest of victims in each
case. In FCA cases, on the other hand, the victim is always the same—the
government. A loss in one case would therefore presumably be more than
made up for through wins in other cases with higher recoveries because
defendants would not receive the benefit of a greatly reduced settlement
in exchange for settling the case.163 DOJ therefore has more latitude to
seek systemically optimal resolutions in the FCA context, justifying a
more, rather than less, assertive policy as to admissions than in the SEC
context.
In the world of FCA litigation, the enforcers do have an additional
reason to seek the path of least resistance in the form of a settlement absent
admission—the prominent role of the qui tam system. As noted in
section IV.A, DOJ enforcers from U.S. Attorneys’ Offices have
significant incentives to compete for the attention of relators’ counsel,
who are generally repeat players. Because relators’ share of recovery (and
thus relators’ counsel’s share) is based on a percentage of the
government’s recovery, any tradeoffs in settlement negotiation that
involve DOJ taking less money in exchange for admissions are likely to
be viewed negatively by the qui tam bar (attorneys who represent relators
in qui tam cases). Conversely, relators’ counsel are likely to look
favorably upon prosecutors who resolve their cases more quickly through
settlement rather than continuing litigation in order to secure admissions
or trial verdicts. The resource pressures expressed by the SEC’s leadership
thus likely apply with even greater force to DOJ’s FCA attorneys.164
Given the lack of an official DOJ policy on the topic of admissions, in
162. SEC’s Andrew Ceresney Defends Neither Admit nor Deny Settlements, CORP. CRIME REP.
(June 6, 2013, 2:01 PM), https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/secceresneyneither
admitnordeny06062013/ [https://perma.cc/RH67-BTMR].
163. This assumption hinges, of course, on another assumption—that DOJ is settling only
meritorious cases that they would likely win at trial. If, as skeptics charge, DOJ is using its leverage
to settle significant numbers of cases it would lose if taken to trial, then DOJ is recovering more
money for the government by settling cases rather than insisting on admissions.
164. See False Claims Act Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. L. &
Governmental Rels. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 299 (1986) (statement of Sen.
William S. Cohen, Sen. William V. Roth & Sen. Carl Levin) (referencing DOJ’s “limited” resources
and the “extensive investments of time and resources required to litigate in federal court”).
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the significant number of cases handled by individual USAOs without the
involvement of the Commercial Litigation Branch, it is largely up to
individual districts whether to require admissions. Because districts rely
largely on qui tams as sources for corporate health care fraud cases, and
relators and their attorneys have virtually unchecked power to select the
district to handle their claims, there is reason to suspect that districts may
shy away from demanding admissions for fear of being viewed as less
hospitable by the relators’ bar, in that the relators’ bar has little or no
interest in increased deterrence and cooperation in the industry, or in
protracted litigation.165
Of the three key players in a typical FCA case—the defendant, the
relator, and DOJ—resolutions without admissions are clearly in the
interest of the first two. And for DOJ, forgoing admissions in favor of
quicker and potentially more lucrative resolutions is in its short-term
interest—it is the long-term, less measurable benefits to DOJ of
maintaining
legitimacy,
which
weigh
in
favor
of
demanding admissions.166
Another difference between the SEC process and DOJ’s FCA process

165. At least one attorney representing corporate health care entities—a former principal deputy
chief of the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York, where
he was responsible for overseeing qui tam actions—has speculated that “qui tam relators who can
choose to file in several districts may think twice about filing in the [Southern District of New York],”
given its stated policy of requiring admissions from FCA defendants. Kevin P. Mulry, Admission of
Wrongdoing Requirement May Make SDNY Less Attractive to Qui Tam Relators, N.Y. HEALTH L.
(Sept. 19, 2013) (emphasis in original), https://www.nyhealthlawblog.com/2013/09/19/another-falseclaims-settlement-requires-admission-of-wrongdoing/ [https://perma.cc/F3G3-29NW] (stating that
“[a] required admission of wrongdoing may stand in the way of – or significantly delay – an FCA
settlement that could otherwise be in the interests of both relator and the defendant”).
Interestingly, however, it does not appear SDNY requires admissions in cases settled by relators
without DOJ intervention. See, for example, Robert Holly’s article VNSNY Agrees to $57M Settlement
in Whistleblower Suit Related to Physician Care Plans, which discusses a case where the relator
settled the non-intervened case for $57 million, and defendant’s general counsel issued the following
statement on the day of the settlement: “For more than five years, we have been forced to defend
ourselves against a lawsuit based on allegations that are simply untrue: We did not bill for visits we
didn’t deliver, nor did we cause harm to our patients. By resolving these claims through the present,
we can put this distraction behind us and move forward, now stronger and even better . . . .” Robert
Holly, VNSNY Agrees to $57M Settlement in Whistleblower Suit Related to Physician Care Plans,
HOME HEALTH CARE NEWS (June 26, 2020), https://homehealthcarenews.com/2020/06/vnsnyagrees-to-57m-settlement-in-whistleblower-suit-related-to-physician-care-plans/
[https://perma.cc/EK5Q-GUF9]; United States v. Visiting Nurse Serv. of N.Y., No. 14-cv-05739,
2017 WL 5515860 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2017).
166. If these motivations do provide an explanation, it is not clearly reflected in the make-up of the
admissions and denials cases. Of the 195 CSAs reviewed for purposes of this article, 131—67%—
stemmed from qui tams. While denials were more common in qui tams than in cases not involving
qui tams—fifty-six of the seventy-two denial cases, or 78%, stemmed from qui tams, admissions were
also more common in qui tams than in cases not involving qui tams—twelve of the sixteen admissions
cases, or 75%, stemmed from qui tams. See infra app. 1.
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may also provide an explanation. It is not a coincidence that a district court
judge, Judge Rakoff, became the most well-known, and likely most
influential, figure driving the movement against the SEC’s “neither admit
nor deny” policy. The SEC’s frequent use of consent decrees entered by
federal district courts to resolve its most serious enforcement actions
makes the judge an additional key player in the resolution. Although the
Second Circuit held that Judge Rakoff failed to give adequate deference
to the SEC’s discretion regarding what settlements are in the public
interest, the requirement that he sign the consent decree interjected him
into the resolution, providing him with the opportunity to comment.167
Even under the more deferential standard adopted by the Second Circuit,
the consent decree process still involves the SEC and the defendant
coming before a court, asking the court to order a series of remedies, and
providing the justification to the court why those remedies should
be adopted.
The resolution of FCA cases involves none of that. In the
approximately one-third of cases that do not stem from a qui tam, there is
generally no judicial involvement at all—the parties enter into an out-ofcourt settlement agreement and that concludes the matter. And even in the
numerous cases that do arise out of qui tams, the statute has thus far not
been interpreted as requiring (or even allowing) judges to examine the
merits of a resolution so long as DOJ and the defendant agree, and the
relator does not object. The statute calls for a hearing for the court to
determine that the settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable” only if
the relator objects.168 As a result, in FCA matters DOJ simply informs the
court that a settlement has been reached and asks that the case be closed—
there is no process of justifying any aspect of the resolution, not the dollar
figure nor the lack of admissions.169
Were the statute to call for judicial involvement in approving
settlements, there is reason to suspect at least some judges would take
issue with DOJ’s handling of the resolutions—requiring DOJ to provide
additional information to the court, and by doing so make it available to
the public. Courts have increasingly pushed back on the terms of criminal
167. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 752 F.3d 285, 291 (2d Cir. 2014).
168. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B) (“The Government may settle the action with the defendant
notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the court determines, after a
hearing, that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances.
Upon a showing of good cause, such hearing may be held in camera.”).
169. See, e.g., United States’ Notice of Election to Intervene in Part and to Decline to Intervene in
Part at 2, United States ex rel. Katko v. Oviatt Hearing & Balance, LLC, No. 5:16-CV-1217
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2018) (“[T]he United States is filing a settlement agreement that it has entered with
Oviatt and the relator. That agreement requires Oviatt to make payment to the United States within
10 days, after which the parties will file a Joint Partial Stipulation of Dismissal.”).
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resolutions between DOJ and health care entities, questioning or outright
declining to go along with proposed plea agreement terms presented to
courts under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C).170 As it
stands currently, however, there is no avenue for a judge to criticize—or
even for a judge, and thus the public, to learn the rationale for—an FCA
settlement between DOJ and a health care entity.
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The benefits to DOJ in increased legitimacy and deterrence through
demanding admissions in FCA cases must, of course, be balanced by the
costs of adopting such a policy. One such cost relates to attracting qui tam
cases, and the problems arising from the incentive for local offices to
adopt policies in order to attract qui tam cases, as described in Part VI.
That cost and problem can be solved through a national policy, thus taking
the pressure off individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices to adopt a practice they
may fear would cause whistleblowers to stay away from their district. This
Part examines the remaining potential costs—efficiency and litigation
risk—in turn and concludes that the former is likely not nearly as
significant as DOJ might fear, and the latter may not be a cost at all when
viewed from the perspective of the public good and the
system’s legitimacy.
A.

Efficiency/Management of Government Resources

In evaluating the impact on efficiency of an increased emphasis on
admissions in FCA settlements, there are three important concepts to
consider by way of background. First, DOJ’s health care fraud
enforcement is enormously profitable. In Fiscal Year 2019 alone, DOJ
recovered $2.6 billion from settlements and judgments in FCA cases
involving the health care industry, representing the tenth consecutive year
that DOJ’s civil health care fraud settlements and judgments have
exceeded $2 billion.171 And the government has boasted that it has done
so efficiently, recovering $4 for every $1 expended on its Health Care
Fraud and Abuse Control Program between 2016–2018.172 Second, DOJ

170. See, e.g., United States v. Aegerion Pharms., Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 217, 228 (D. Mass. Nov.
20, 2017) (rejecting pharmaceutical corporation’s Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C)
guilty plea to two misdemeanor counts of introducing misbranded drugs into interstate commerce as
“not in the public interest”).
171. DOJ Jan. 9, 2020 Press Release, supra note 10.
172. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND
ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 10 (2019),
https://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/FY2018-hcfac.pdf [https://perma.cc/E67F-BLXD].
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has accomplished this profitability despite failing to utilize the top end of
FCA exposure through settlements above double damages.173 Third, DOJ
has, in contrast, consistently demanded treble damages and penalties after
winning cases at trial.174
There is reason to believe DOJ could demand and obtain admissions
without causing a flood of trials. Because DOJ offers such a large financial
incentive to FCA defendants to settle their cases rather than take them to
trial, defendants take on greater financial risk than the government when
an FCA proceeds to trial. Given the potential for treble damages and
penalties, an FCA trial is often a “bet the company” event for a defendant,
while the dollar figures are small in the context of federal health care
spending.175 In addition to the financial incentives, defendants also enjoy
other benefits if they are able to avoid trial: Trials are expensive and timeconsuming for defendants, even more so than they are for the government,
and trials increase the negative publicity of government enforcement
relative to resolutions in which the investigation and the resolution are
frequently announced simultaneously.176 There is meaningful, if limited,
evidence to support the prediction that the government could insist on
admissions without unleashing a flood of trials—the two districts that
have demanded admissions in their FCA resolutions have continued to
settle cases and have not been host to a large number of FCA trials.177
Given the extent to which DOJ currently rewards settling defendants
by reducing the damages multiplier, it is possible that DOJ’s health care
fraud enforcement would become more profitable, not less, were more

173. Elberg, supra note 1 (finding that none of the eighty-nine resolutions examined between early
2018 and June 2019 involved the imposition of penalties or a multiplier higher than 2.75, only three
had multipliers above 2.5, and only eleven above 2.0).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting the government’s
demand of $81 million based on $245,392 in actual damages and civil penalties of $10,000 for each
of 8,002 separate CPT codes).
175. Concerns regarding potential HHS-OIG exclusion would also continue to create pressure for
defendants to settle. See supra Part IV. For the government, the roughly $2 billion recovered annually
through health care FCA cases is less than 0.2% of the more than $1.3 trillion the federal government
spent on Medicare and Medicaid alone in 2018, and less than 0.05% of the approximately $3.6 trillion
in National Health Expenditure in 2018. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 118.
176. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (“The complaint shall be filed in camera, [and] shall remain under
seal . . . .”); Paul Radvany, The SEC Adds a New Weapon: How Does the New Admission Requirement
Change the Landscape?, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665, 673–74 (2014).
177. See Elberg, supra note 1. Outside of the health care and FCA arena, DOJ notably required
admission in numerous civil settlements with companies relating to residential mortgage backed
securities (RMBS), again without leading to numerous trials. See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of Pub.
Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Credit Suisse Agrees to Pay $5.28 Billion in Connection with Its Sale of
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/creditsuisse-agrees-pay-528-billion-connection-its-sale-residential-mortgage-backed
[https://perma.cc/TF5Q-9XJR] (announcing a settlement containing admissions).
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defendants to refuse to settle and take their cases to trial rather than enter
into a settlement including admissions. Although DOJ would have to
expend (or at least threaten to expend) substantial additional resources at
trial, the government would be rewarded with obtaining roughly twice as
much (including the increase to treble damages and penalties) following
a successful verdict because defendants would not obtain the settlement
benefit of a reduced payment amount.178
Were a policy change to lead more defendants to refuse settlement in
favor of trial, it would mean DOJ would need to either increase resources
by hiring more personnel or handling fewer cases. The former may be
preferable, as the cost of increased personnel would be negligible
compared to the dollars to be gained through increased FCA enforcement,
particularly of cases involving the most egregious conduct or involving
the greatest amount of damages.179 In the context of the SEC, Professor
John Coffee has suggested that the government taking on fewer cases
could be a positive, as it would lead the enforcer to prioritize and put
greater resources into the cases it brings.180 His argument is even stronger
in the FCA context, where DOJ does not have to simply drop lower
priority cases and allow misconduct to go unpunished—DOJ has the
ability to identify appropriate cases for capable and well-resourced
relator’s counsel to take on a primary role, while shifting DOJ resources
to higher priority cases.181
Greater deterrence would be achieved whether defendants make the
admissions (thus increasing the severity of the resolution) or refuse to

178. While it is impossible to predict what percentage of additional trials would lead to victories
for the government, it is worth noting that only a small percentage of federal criminal defendants are
historically acquitted at trial. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CTS., TABLE D-4: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS DISPOSED OF, BY TYPE OF DISPOSITION AND OFFENSE, DURING THE 12MONTH PERIODS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30 2018, at 1 (2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/data_tables/jb_d4_0930.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ PJ6A-D5B7] (compiling statistics and
noting 237 defendants acquitted after jury trials and eighty-three after bench trials as compared to
73,109 convictions via plea or trial).
179. By way of comparison, while DOJ recovered more than $1 million from 145 separate FCA
settlements between early 2018 and April 2020 reviewed for purposes of this Article, DOJ annual
salaries for Assistant U.S. Attorneys in 2021 ranged from a minimum of $55,756 to a maximum of
$172,400. See Salary Information: Administratively Determined Pay Plan Charts, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST.: OFFS. OF THE U.S. ATT’YS (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/usao/career-center/salaryinformation/administratively-determined-pay-plan-charts [https://perma.cc/SM7C-YRC6].
180. John C. Coffee, Jr., The End of Phony Deterrence? ‘SEC v. Bank of America,’ LAW.COM:
N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 17, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/
1202433852330/the-end-of-phony-deterrence-sec-v-bank-of-america/ [https://perma.cc/N9HTA55W].
181. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (“If the government elects not to proceed with the action, the
person who initiated the action shall have the right to conduct the action.”).
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make the admissions and the government wins at trial.182 Such benefits,
as well as the benefits of increased legitimacy discussed in section IV.B,
must also be factored into DOJ’s resource allocation calculus.
B.

Litigation Risk

If a policy of demanding admissions did result in an increased number
of FCA trials, with that increase would come a greater risk that DOJ would
lose some of those trials. From DOJ’s internal perspective, the risk of
losing at trial is, of course, a negative—losses bring consequences both
financial and reputational. However, not only are those negatives
outweighed in the aggregate by the likely benefits discussed above, but
that increased litigation risk brings with it important benefits in the form
of increased transparency and, assuming the cases are meritorious and
DOJ prevails at trial, increased legitimacy.
At the heart of skepticism surrounding DOJ’s FCA enforcement is the
idea that DOJ may well be settling cases in which the defendant would
prevail were the case to proceed to trial, asserting weak claims, avoiding
trial, and incentivizing defendants to settle with a big stick and modest
cost of buy-out.183 This concern—which was an assumption of Krause’s
criticism of the FCA and is the message behind each statement by a
settling defendant that they entered into the settlement solely to avoid the
time and expense of litigation—is supported by the paucity of FCA trials
and the dramatic incentives for defendants to settle created by the gap
between FCA exposure and DOJ’s settlement practices.184 Thus,
assuming DOJ were to be (or continued to be) careful about the claims it
asserts, and more frequently requires admission or taking the case to trial,

182. See Radvany, supra note 176, at 703. The author was a former Deputy Chief of the Criminal
Division of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York where he
oversaw the Securities Fraud Unit.
183. Krause, supra note 141, at 126, 204 (first citing Uwe E. Reinhardt, Medicare Can Turn Anyone
into a Crook, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2000, at A18; then citing Timothy P. Blanchard, Medicare Medical
Necessity Determinations Revisited: Abuse of Discretion and Abuse of Process in the War Against
Medicare Fraud and Abuse, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 91, 114 (1999) (arguing that FCA’s “threat of
draconian . . . sanctions coerces providers into settlements regarding issues on which providers would
most likely prevail”); then citing John T. Boese & Beth C. McClain, Why Thompson Is Wrong: Misuse
of the False Claims Act to Enforce the Anti-Kickback Act, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1999) (arguing
penalty structure “places great pressure on defendants to settle even meritless suits”); then citing
Thomas S. Crane, Health Care, Defense Industry Must Regroup Efforts to Reform False Claims Act,
3 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 358 (1999) (arguing FCA penalties are among “the most abused
tools in the government’s arsenal to leverage exorbitant settlements”); and then citing William M.
Sage, Fraud and Abuse Law, 282 [J]AMA 1179, 1180 (1999) (noting “large organizations have such
a large stake in avoiding exclusion from Medicare that they readily settle pending charges, making
much of fraud control resemble a rebate program more than a law enforcement exercise”)).
184. Id.
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DOJ’s increased cost of going to trial more often would be more than
balanced out by not only the increased monetary recovery, but also by the
enhanced legitimacy. Krause took issue with the conclusions of Professors
Timothy Jost and Sharon Davies—who defended the FCA and argued that
the statute’s mens rea requirement protects against Krause’s concern of
punishing defendants who have made innocent mistakes within a complex
system.185 Krause responded that “the fact that no such finding of intent is
required in a settlement raises the possibility that prosecutors will settle
with defendants who might very well prevail at trial.”186 A policy of
requiring admissions would address Krause’s concern, while
simultaneously addressing Jost and Davies’s concern that FCA
settlements are insufficiently severe from a deterrence perspective.187
As Krause noted, the problem of lack of trials goes beyond depriving
courts of the opportunity to weigh in on grey area legal issues—it runs the
risk of impairing views of the system’s legitimacy by giving observers
reason to question its procedural fairness.188 Viewed in these terms, an
increase in trials—even if some are lost by DOJ—would improve views
of the system’s legitimacy and thus might paradoxically advance DOJ’s
efforts to secure cooperation and to create a culture of compliance in the
health care industry.
Transparency and thus legitimacy would benefit even before the trial
at the end of the litigation process. Because most FCA cases not only
settle, but settle without DOJ filing a complaint, there is virtually no
transparency as to the scope of a defendant’s culpable conduct—unlike in
the criminal system, even the often-denied and only rarely admitted
allegations are a product of negotiation, and motion practice allowing
courts to weigh in on government theories and evidence are virtually nonexistent.189 Instead of bare bones allegations that are no sooner announced
185. Id. at 206; Jost & Davies, supra note 13, at 303.
186. Krause, supra note 141, at 207–08.
187. Jost and Davies conclude that “complete deterrence” rather than “optimal deterrence” is
appropriate because health care fraud provides no social benefit. Jost & Davies, supra note 13, at
272–77.
188. Krause, supra note 141, at 211–12; see supra section V.B.
189. While there appears to be a recent uptick in the number of FCA complaints filed by DOJ, the
number of complaints still pales in comparison to the number of matters resolved without the filing
of a complaint. In addition, at least two districts (the Southern District of New York and the District
of Vermont) have a practice of filing complaints at the time of settlement for purpose of providing
details regarding DOJ’s allegations, but these similarly account only for a small number of cases. See,
e.g., Complaint, United States v. Centerlight Health Sys., No. 1:13-CV-08502 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28,
2018) (filing complaint on same day as filing a letter informing Judge “the parties have reached an
agreement to settle the allegations”); Complaint, United States v. Greenway Health, LLC, No. 2:19CV-00020 (D. Vt. Feb. 6, 2019) (filing complaint one day prior to filing Notice of Dismissal attaching
Settlement Agreement).
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than they are denied by defendants, the meaningful threat of litigation as
a backdrop would mean increased transparency, allowing observers to see
the full details of the government’s allegations and the evidence
supporting those charges. Regardless of whether the case proceeds to trial
and regardless even of whether the government prevails in the end, the
public—and particularly the health care industry and the defense bar—
would see in those details and that evidence a sound basis for DOJ’s
decision to bring the case and have increased confidence that DOJ is
seeking to do justice.
C.

Potential Benefits of a Targeted Approach to Admissions

To the extent DOJ is settling cases it believes would succeed through
litigation and trial, it is a change that could be made with substantial
benefit but likely minimal cost, as demonstrated by the individual U.S.
Attorney’s Offices that have already been requiring admissions. If DOJ
prefers to instead dip its toe into the admissions water, as the SEC’s
current approach demonstrates, DOJ need not make a stark choice
between seeking admissions in all cases or admissions in none. Instead,
DOJ can identify cases where admissions are particularly important—
those cases involving the largest dollar amounts, harm beyond that to
government funds, conduct that is particularly egregious, or which are
otherwise likely to receive increased attention from the general public or
the health care industry—and forgo seeking admissions in all other cases.
Such an approach would arguably be advisable not only from a
resource-allocation perspective but with a view towards maximizing the
moral credibility of DOJ’s FCA enforcement system. Professor Paul H.
Robinson has examined arguments for strengthening or blurring the
distinction between criminal and civil law, concluding that it is necessary
to maintain the distinction in order to preserve the criminal law’s moral
credibility.190 Robinson’s focus was on the need for criminal law to
convey condemnation and impose punishment in order to fulfill society’s
desire to see truly condemnable conduct treated as such.191 Notably,
Robinson was referring to the distinction (or lack of distinction) between
criminal law and the civil tort system, and did not address the placement
of civil enforcement by government prosecutors.192 As discussed above,
the FCA is the government’s primary enforcement tool in the area of

190. See Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 201 (1996).
191. Id. at 211.
192. Id. The article was part of a Boston University Law Review symposium on The Intersection
of Tort and Criminal Law.
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health care fraud by corporate entities—the line between criminal and
civil is already blurred both by government’s role in the action and by
DOJ’s use of the FCA to handle misconduct it explicitly views
as condemnable.193
Whether DOJ should revisit the primary role of the FCA in its health
care fraud enforcement efforts is a broader topic for future discussion.
Two things in this regard are worth noting: DOJ has seemingly sought to
increase the use of criminal enforcement of corporate health care fraud,
reinforcing parallel proceedings policies, which purportedly lead to all qui
tam complaints being reviewed by criminal prosecutors for potential
criminal investigation and prosecution; and making a change in this area
would be incredibly difficult given the outsized role of a qui tam system
reliant on whistleblowers and their counsel to trust that DOJ’s primary
concern in considering their allegations will be financial recovery under
the FCA.194
As long as the FCA continues in its current role leading health care
fraud enforcement, Robinson’s concerns are seemingly applicable.
Krause and others have criticized DOJ for using the FCA to sweep in not
only “straightforward fraud,” but also “a proliferation of new theories that
seek to style regulatory noncompliance as a false claim”—a criticism
consistent with Robinson’s lament that “criminal law has been expanded
to include what were traditionally civil violations.”195 DOJ’s FCA
settlements regularly cover that full spectrum, ranging from allegations of
blatant bribery in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute (violations of
which are presumably also criminal) to the more technical violations
193. See supra section I.A. Robinson’s attempts at drawing distinctions would similarly lead to
difficulty placing the FCA clearly into the criminal or civil camp. Robinson noted differences between
the criminal and civil systems—“the public versus private nature of the plaintiffs, the public versus
private recipients of a fine or award, the availability of the consent and de minimis defenses, the
prohibition of insurance against criminal penalties, and the need for greater procedural safeguards for
criminal liability”—the first three of which would put the FCA in the criminal camp while the latter
two would seemingly put the FCA in the civil camp. Robinson, supra note 190, at 208; see also
Winship & Robbennolt, supra note 7, at 1095 (noting that the debate over whether civil enforcement
should require admissions “reflects competing norms . . . [between] civil settlements between private
parties, in which admissions of liability would seem oddly out of place . . . [and] criminal
prosecutions, in which admissions (or adjudications) of wrongdoing are almost always required”
(footnote omitted)).
194. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual: Org. & Functions Manual § 27 (2012); Leslie R. Caldwell,
Assistant U.S. Att’y Gen. for the Crim. Div., Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the
Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund Conference (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa
/speech/remarks-assistant-attorney-general-criminal-division-leslie-r-caldwell-taxpayers-against
[https://perma.cc/N7S2-VKVG] (announcing that all new qui tam complaints would be shared by the
Civil Division with the Criminal Division “as soon as the cases are filed . . . to determine whether to
open a parallel criminal investigation”).
195. Krause, supra note 141, at 144; Robinson, supra note 190, at 210.
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Krause warned against. And the FCA’s intent requirement also sweeps in
a spectrum of misconduct ranging from the clearly condemnable willful
fraud to the more civil-seeming action “in reckless disregard of the truth
or falsity of . . . information.”196 Robinson argued that criminal law can
increase compliance by “facilitating and communicating consensus on
what is and is not condemnable,” so long as it has maintained its “moral
credibility.”197 The same is presumably true of DOJ’s enforcement under
the FCA—if a requirement of admissions is used selectively in the cases
most worthy of condemnation, DOJ can potentially not only nurture its
moral credibility but also signal what conduct is condemnable and
improve its efforts to build norms and promote compliance.198
If DOJ is to take this more measured approach, it must at minimum
insist on “no denial” language in those settlements without admissions
and end the current practice of defendants casting aspersions on the
system’s legitimacy at the moment when DOJ is seeking to obtain
deterrence through announcing a settlement.
CONCLUSION
With increased focus on DOJ’s FCA practices due to recent policy
changes, and additional attention anticipated as DOJ uses the FCA to
address high-profile COVID-19 fraud, the FCA system is at risk of seeing
its already fragile credibility crumble further. Whether the lack of
admissions in DOJ’s FCA settlements is a reflection of DOJ using its
power to coerce settlements in cases that would not succeed at trial or of
a well-intentioned desire to preserve resources and ensure recoveries, the
result is the same—a system with few trials but many denials, with the
government never doing more than alleging, and defendants claiming to
be victims of a DOJ shakedown.
DOJ’s current efforts at short-term preservation of resources and
quicker recoveries in individual cases have a negative impact on DOJ’s
acknowledged goals—maximizing deterrence through the prospect of
enforcement with accountability, encouraging the corporate cooperation
necessary to prosecute individual bad actors, and cultivating a culture of
compliance throughout the health care industry. Because of a statutory
196. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(iii).
197. Robinson, supra note 190, at 212–13.
198. Robinson writes of both condemnation and punishment. While condemnation can be
addressed through requiring admissions, punishment could presumably be addressed, if DOJ so
desires, through an adjustment to the FCA multiplier based on the nature of the misconduct. At
present, there is no discernable DOJ policy—either in statements by DOJ or in the CSA’s reviewed
for this Article—of adjusting FCA multipliers based on the degree of wrongfulness of the
defendant’s misconduct.
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and procedural system providing virtually no opportunity for the judicial
push that spurred change to the SEC’s practices, change must come from
a recognition by DOJ that its current approach of not requiring admissions
is short-sided. By increasing both accountability and transparency, DOJ
can further its enforcement goals and send a clear message that its
practices are consistent with its mission to do justice.
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Appendix 1:
Health Care FCA Settlements
All

Mean
Multiplier
1.73

Involved
CLB
69 (35.4%)199

Admissions 16 (8.2%)

1.90

2 (2.9%)201

Denials203

1.64

34 (49.3%)204

Total

195

72 (36.9%)

Qui Tam
131
(67.2%)200
12
(9.2%)202
56
(42.7%)205

199. Percentage refers to the percentage of Total CSAs that involved the Commercial Litigation
Branch.
200. Percentage refers to the percentage of Total CSAs that involved qui tams.
201. Percentage refers to the percentage of CSAs involving the Commercial Litigation Branch that
contained admissions.
202. Percentage refers to the percentage of CSAs involving qui tams that contained admissions.
203. In Appendix 1, the “Denials” category includes both CSAs containing an explicit denial within
the CSA and CSAs where defendants issued statements denying wrongdoing at the time of the
announcement of the CSA.
204. Percentage refers to the percentage of CSAs involving the Commercial Litigation Branch that
involved denials.
205. Percentage refers to the percentage of CSAs involving qui tams that involved denials.
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Appendix 2:
Health Care FCA Settlements CSA Language

Total
Explicit Denial206
“Not an admission” language207
“To avoid the delay, etc.” language208

Number of CSAs
195
50 (25.6%)
150 (76.9%)
162 (83.1%)

206. In Appendix 2, the “Explicit Denial” category includes only CSAs containing an explicit
denial within the CSA. If a defendant publicly denied wrongdoing at the time of the announcement
of the CSA, but the denial was not included within the CSA, it is not counted in this category.
207. “This Agreement is neither an admission of liability by [defendant] nor a concession by the
United States that its claims are not well-founded,” or its functional equivalent.
208. “To avoid the delay, uncertainty, inconvenience, and expense of protracted litigation of the
above conduct, and in consideration of the mutual promises and obligations of this Settlement
Agreement, the Parties agree and covenant as follows,” or its functional equivalent.

Elberg (Do Not Delete)

424

6/5/2021 10:46 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:371

